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  INTRODUCTION   
In 2016, the Mississippi legislature passed the “Protecting 
Freedom of Conscience from Government Discrimination Act,” 
better known as House Bill (H.B.) 1523.1 In what LGBTQ advo-
cates have described as one of the most sweeping anti-LGBTQ 
laws in the nation,2 H.B. 1523 includes several religious exemp-
tions that permit religiously-affiliated organizations and indi-
viduals to deny services or benefits to same-sex couples and 
LGBTQ individuals in a variety of domains, including employ-
ment, public accommodations, housing, adoption, and marriage 
solemnization.3 A less discussed part of the Mississippi law af-
fects a largely overlooked and vulnerable segment of the LGBT 
population: lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and questioning 
(LGBTQ) youth4 in the child welfare system.5  
Now in effect,6 H.B. 1523 prohibits state actors from taking 
adverse action against any religious organization that provides 
or declines to provide foster care or adoption services consistent 
with its religious or moral views.7 LGBTQ advocates warn that 
child welfare providers may not work with LGBTQ youth in need 
of support, including those who have been kicked out of their 
 
 1. H.R. 1523, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2016). 
 2. The Nation’s Worst Anti-LGBTQ State Law Goes into Effect in Missis-
sippi, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.hrc.org/blog/the-nations 
-worst-anti-lgbtq-state-law-goes-into-effect-this-week-in-missis. 
 3. See generally Miss. H.R. 1523. 
 4. For simplicity purposes, in this Article, I use the term “youth” to refer 
generally to both teenagers and children below the age of eighteen. It is im-
portant to note that several jurisdictions have extended the definition of “youth” 
past the age of eighteen to increase support for young people before they eman-
cipate from the child welfare system. See Extending Foster Care Beyond 18, 
NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (July 28, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/ 
human-services/extending-foster-care-to-18.aspx. 
 5. Miss. H.R. 1523. § 3(2)–(4); see infra Part III.B. 
 6. In January 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court denied a Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari in Barber v. Bryant, in which the Fifth Circuit lifted a preliminary 
injunction that prevented H.B. 1523 from taking effect. 860 F.3d 345 (2017), 
cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 652 (2018) (mem.). 
 7. Miss. H.R. 1523 § 3(2). 
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families because of their sexual orientations or gender identi-
ties.8 Some providers may outright reject LGBTQ youth from re-
ceiving support, leaving those youth with little choice but to live 
on their own in homelessness.9 Other providers might force 
LGBTQ youth to stay closeted in order to receive support, and 
place them with parents who hold hostile attitudes toward 
LGBTQ people.10 
With regard to parenting, H.B. 1523 also prohibits state ac-
tors from taking adverse action against foster parents who 
“guide, instruct, or raise” a child consistent with their religious 
views.11 As a result, LGBTQ youth could be forced to stay in fos-
ter homes that denounce their sexual orientations or gender 
identities.12 In addition, foster parents could force transgender 
youth to dress in ways that are inconsistent with their gender 
identities, or discipline LGBTQ youth for age-appropriate con-
duct and expressions related to their sexual orientations or gen-
der identities.13 In more extreme cases, foster parents could pres-
sure LGBTQ youth to undergo damaging conversion therapies 
that try to change a person’s sexual orientation or gender iden-
tity.14  
A robust and growing body of legal scholarship is addressing 
how to resolve conflicts between religious liberty and LGBTQ 
equality, especially in the same-sex marriage context.15 Several 
 
 8. MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., KIDS PAY THE PRICE: HOW 
RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS FOR CHILD WELFARE AGENCIES HARM CHILDREN 6 
(2017), http://www.lgbtmap.org/file/Kids%20Pay%20the%20Price%20FINAL 
.pdf. 
 9. See infra Part III.B. 
 10. MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., supra note 8, at 5–6. 
 11. Miss. H.R. 1523 § 3(3). 
 12. MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., supra note 8, at 6. 
 13. Brief of CSE Plaintiffs-Appellees at 7, Barber v. Bryant, 860 F.3d 345 
(2017) (Nos. 16-60477, 16-60478), 2016 WL 7337074. 
 14. MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., supra note 8, at 2. Scholars 
have described how conversion therapy practices themselves have religious 
roots. See, e.g., Marie-Amelie George, Expressive Ends: Understanding Conver-
sion Therapy Bans, 68 ALA. L. REV. 793, 801–21 (2017) (detailing historical and 
current connections between religion and conversion therapy practices). 
 15. See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, What Same-Sex-Marriage and Religious-Lib-
erty Claims Have in Common, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 206 (2010) (arguing for 
adopting religious accommodations for objectors to same-sex marriage); Maggie 
Gallagher, Why Accommodate? Reflections on the Gay Marriage Culture Wars, 
5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 260 (2010) (providing reasons to accommodate religious 
liberty); Nancy J. Knauer, Religious Exemptions, Marriage Equality, and the 
Establishment of Religion, 84 UMKC L. REV. 749 (2016) (examining religious 
exemptions in light of traditional civil rights and religious liberty protections); 
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courts have joined in this debate,16 which endures after the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo-
rado Civil Rights Commission left many questions unresolved 
about how to mediate these conflicts.17 As scholars and judges 
flesh out whether bakers, photographers, florists, and others can 
invoke their religious views to deny services and benefits to 
same-sex couples who are married or intend to marry, far less 
 
Andrew Koppelman, A Free Speech Response to the Gay Rights/Religious Lib-
erty Conflict, 110 NW. U. L. Rev. 1125 (2016) (arguing in favor of allowing busi-
nesses to make their objections to same-sex marriage publicly known despite 
hostile environment free speech concerns); Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Ine-
quality: Same-Sex Relationships, Religious Exemptions, and the Production of 
Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1169 (2012) (highlight-
ing the inappropriate attention on marriage in sexual orientation discrimina-
tion cases); Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-
Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2558–66 
(2015) (discussing same-sex marriage and LGBTQ equality); James M. Oleske, 
Jr., The Evolution of Accommodation: Comparing the Unequal Treatment of Re-
ligious Objections to Interracial and Same-Sex Marriages, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 99 (2015) (explaining the rise of religious argumentation since debates 
on interracial marriage); Elizabeth Sepper, Doctoring Discrimination in the 
Same-Sex Marriage Debates, 89 IND. L.J. 703 (2014) (critiquing the theoretical 
premise for extending the conscientious objector model to the same-sex mar-
riage debates); Roger Severino, Or for Poorer? How Same-Sex Marriage Threat-
ens Religious Liberty, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 939 (2007) (contouring tension 
between religious liberty and free speech after changes in marriage laws); Marc 
D. Stern, Liberty v. Equality; Equality v. Liberty, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 307 
(2010) (proposing recognition of religious liberty in same-sex marriage legisla-
tion); Robin Fretwell Wilson, Marriage of Necessity: Same-Sex Marriage and 
Religious Liberty Protections, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1161 (2014) (discussing 
trade-off of religious liberty protections for marriage equality). See generally 
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS (Douglas 
Laycock et al. eds. 2008) (edited essay collection). 
 16. See, e.g., Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272 (Colo. App. 
2015), rev’d sub nom. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 
138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018); Elane Photography, L.L.C. v. Willock, 2013-NMSC-040, 
309 P.3d 53; Gifford v. McCarthy, 23 N.Y.S.3d 422 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016); State 
v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543 (Wash. 2017), vacated and remanded, 
138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018) (mem.) (considering Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 
1719). 
 17. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719; Adam Liptak, Justices Favor 
Baker in Case on Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2018, at A1 (noting that the 
Court’s decision was “narrow, and it left open the larger question of whether a 
business can discriminate against gay men and lesbians based on rights pro-
tected by the First Amendment”). Although Masterpiece Cakeshop left many 
questions unresolved about conflicts between religious liberty and LGBTQ 
equality, it is important to recognize that some scholars posit that the Court’s 
decision upheld approaches to public accommodations law that limit religious 
exemptions in order to prevent harm to others who do not hold an objector’s 
religious or moral views. See generally Douglas NeJaime & Reva Siegel, Reli-
gious Exemptions and Antidiscrimination Law in Masterpiece Cakeshop, 128 
YALE L.J.F. 201 (2018). 
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attention is being paid to conflicts between religious liberty and 
LGBTQ equality in situations that do not involve marriage, in-
cluding those that affect LGBTQ youth.18 The lack of attention 
to LGBTQ youth in this debate is consistent with critiques of 
mainstream mobilization around LGBTQ rights for primarily 
benefiting LGBTQ adults and neglecting LGBTQ youth.19  
Recently, several states have enacted laws like Mississippi’s 
H.B. 1523 that allow the religious or moral views of key actors 
in the child welfare system (for example, private child welfare 
providers, caseworkers, or foster or adoptive parents) to guide 
the nature of the child welfare services they provide, even if their 
views denounce LGBTQ people.20 Currently, ten states have 
broad religious exemption laws involving LGBTQ child welfare 
and more states could introduce new measures.21 Similar federal 
legislation has also been introduced in Congress.22 Proponents of 
 
 18. See infra Part IV. 
 19. Julie A. Nice, The Responsibility of Victory: Confronting the Systemic 
Subordination of LGBT Youth and Considering a Positive Role for the State, 23 
TEMP. POL. & C.R.L. REV. 373, 375 (2014) (“Indeed, it appears that most of the 
progress of the LGBT rights movement to date has primarily been for the ben-
efit of LGBT adults, with far fewer protections for LGBT youth.”). 
 20. Those states are Alabama, H.R. 24, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2017); 
Kansas, S. 284, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2018); Michigan, H.R. 4188, 98th 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2018) (codified as MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.124e); Mis-
sissippi, H.R. 1523, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2016); North Dakota, S. 2188, 
58th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2003) (codified as N.D. CENT. CODE  
§ 50-12-07.1); Oklahoma, S. 1140, 56th Leg., 2nd Sess. (Okla. 2018); South Car-
olina, H.R. 4950, 2018 Leg., 122nd Sess. § 38.29 (S.C. 2018); South Dakota, S. 
149, 2017 Leg. Assemb., 92nd Sess. (S.D. 2017); Texas, H.R. 3859, 85th Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017); and Virginia, H.R. 189, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2012) 
(codified as VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1709.3). 
 21. See supra note 20. In addition, there are currently three cases pending 
in federal court involving conflicts between religious liberty and LGBTQ equal-
ity in child welfare contexts. In two of those cases, same-sex couples sued the 
state after being denied as prospective foster or adoptive parents by a taxpayer-
funded, private faith-based child placement agency on religious grounds. 
Marouf v. Azar, No. 1:18-CV-378, 298 WL 4859792 (D.D.C. Feb. 20, 2018) (suing 
for declaratory and injunctive relief and monetary damages); Dumont v. Lyon, 
341 F. Supp. 3d 706 (E.D. Mich. 2018). In the third case, Catholic Social Services 
and four of its foster parents sued the City of Philadelphia after the city ceased 
referring children to two faith-based child placement agencies that would not 
license same-sex couples to be foster parents. Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 320 
F. Supp. 3d 661 (E.D. Pa. 2018), filing appeal. 
 22. See, e.g., Ryan Thoreson, U.S. Congress Rejects Anti-LGBT Adoption 
Amendment, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.hrw.org/news/ 
2018/09/28/us-congress-rejects-anti-lgbt-adoption-amendment (discussing re-
jection of the Aderhold Amendment to a federal appropriations bills that would 
allow child welfare service providers to provide services in ways that are con-
sistent with their religious beliefs and to withhold federal funds from state or 
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these bills have argued that protecting the ability of private 
faith-based organizations to provide child welfare services in ac-
cordance with their religious views “takes nothing away from an-
yone.”23 They assert that public child welfare agencies and other 
private organizations can still accept prospective unmarried or 
same-sex parents.24 
In focusing on the sexualities of prospective foster and adop-
tive parents, this framing overshadows LGBTQ youth in the 
child welfare system. As this Article explains, it is critical to in-
clude the experiences of LGBTQ youth at the center of the debate 
over conflicts between religious liberty and LGBTQ equality in 
child welfare contexts. A distinct yet largely overlooked aspect of 
religious exemptions involving LGBTQ child welfare is that 
these measures intervene against the backdrop of a public wel-
fare system that is already fraught with LGBTQ-based inequal-
ities and commonly fails LGBTQ youth in need of help from the 
state—an especially vulnerable segment of the LGBTQ popula-
tion.25 
LGBTQ youth, and in particular LGBTQ youth of color, are 
overrepresented in the child welfare system.26 Yet, LGBTQ 
 
local governments that violate that mandate); see also Child Welfare Provider 
Inclusion Act, S. 811, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R. 1881, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 23. SARRA TORRE & RYAN T. ANDERSON, THE HERITAGE FOUND., ADOP-
TION, FOSTER CARE, AND CONSCIENCE PROTECTION 1, 8 (2014), http://thf_media 
.s3.amazonaws.com/2014/pdf/BG2869.pdf. 
 24. Id. at 8. For instance, in a recent federal lawsuit challenging Michigan’s 
practice of using taxpayer funds to contract with private faith-based child place-
ment agencies, the director of a defendant-intervenor faith-based organization 
stated that “if [prospective parents] let us know that they’re unmarried, or 
they’re gay or lesbian, we immediately recommend, make a referral to another 
agency.” Complaint ¶ 43, Dumont, 341 F. Supp. 3d 706 (No. 17-CV-13080). 
 25. See infra Part III.B. 
 26. FRANK J. BEWKES ET AL., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, WELCOMING ALL 
FAMILIES: DISCRIMINATION AGAINST LGBTQ FOSTER AND ADOPTIVE PARENTS 
HURTS CHILDREN 4 (2018), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/content/uploads/ 
2018/11/19131646/WelcomingAllFamilies.pdf (“Studies have found that be-
tween 19 percent and 23 percent of youth in the U.S. foster care system identify 
as LGBTQ, meaning that youth are overrepresented in the foster care system 
by at least a factor of two.”); MEGAN MARTIN ET AL., CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF 
SOC. POLICY, OUT OF THE SHADOWS: SUPPORTING LGBTQ YOUTH IN THE CHILD 
WELFARE SYSTEM THROUGH CROSS-SYSTEM COLLABORATION 8 (2016), https:// 
cssp.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Out-of-the-Shadows-Supporting-LGBTQ 
-youth-in-child-welfare-through-cross-system-collaboration-web.pdf (summa-
rizing studies finding that LGBTQ youth are overrepresented in the child wel-
fare system); BIANCA WILSON ET AL., THE WILLIAMS INST., SEXUAL AND GENDER 
MINORITY YOUTH IN FOSTER CARE: ASSESSING DISPROPORTIONALITY AND DIS-
PARITIES IN LOS ANGELES 6, 22 (2014), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp 
-content/uploads/LAFYS_report_final-aug-2014.pdf (reporting study findings 
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youth are more frequently rejected or unwanted by foster fami-
lies, adoptive parents, and group homes.27 Many LGBTQ youth 
also experience discrimination from child welfare providers and 
frontline caseworkers, which can negatively affect their place-
ment and treatment in the child welfare system.28 In addition, 
LGBTQ youth suffer higher rates of physical, sexual, and verbal 
abuse in foster families and group homes.29 These challenges 
cause many LGBTQ youth to leave or be kicked out of child wel-
fare placements only to wind up homeless, funneled into the ju-
venile justice system, or both.30  
This Article analyzes conflicts between religious liberty and 
child welfare issues pertaining to LGBTQ youth. It seeks to ex-
amine connections between religious exemptions in the LGBTQ 
child welfare context and the preservation of traditional norms 
of sex, sexuality, and gender in the child welfare system. It fur-
ther seeks to understand how subordinating the LGBTQ identi-
ties of youth to the religious or moral views of child welfare ac-
tors implicates normative commitments to equality both inside 
and outside of the child welfare system.  
To accomplish these goals, this Article recasts the contem-
porary push for religious exemptions in the LGBTQ child welfare 
context through the lens of historical theories of sexual deviance 
in the fields of criminology, psychology, and sociology.31 Before 
sodomy decriminalization started in the late-1960s,32 theories of 
 
that 19.1% of youth in the Los Angeles County foster system identified as 
LGBTQ, and that over 80% of those LGBTQ foster youth also identified as youth 
of color). 
 27. WILSON ET AL., supra note 26, at 5, 11; Anne Gallegos et al., Exploring 
the Experiences of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Questioning Adolescents in Fos-
ter Care, 14 J. FAM. SOC. WORK 226, 228 (2011). 
 28. WILSON ET AL., supra note 26, at 11; Ariel Love, A Room of One’s Own: 
Safe Placement for Transgender Youth in Foster Care, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2265, 
2275 (2014).  
 29. RANDI FEINSTEIN ET AL., A REPORT ON LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND 




 30. See generally Jordan Blair Woods, Unaccompanied Youth and Private-
Public Order Failures, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1639, 1648 (2018) (discussing connec-
tions between the rejection of LGBTQ youth in the child welfare system and 
homelessness). 
 31. See infra Part I. This Article focuses specifically on historical theories 
of sexual deviance developed in the twentieth century. 
 32. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., DISHONORABLE PASSIONS: SODOMY LAWS IN 
AMERICA 1861–2003, at 136–94 (2008) (discussing sodomy law reform starting 
in the 1960s). 
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sexual deviance offered an ideological framework to justify crim-
inalizing private consensual same-sex sex and gender non-con-
forming conduct.33 Scholars and courts have described how both 
before and after sodomy decriminalization, the stigma of sexual 
deviance against LGBTQ people extended beyond the criminal 
realm to also place LGBTQ people at risk for discrimination in 
the civil realm (for instance, in family, employment, and educa-
tion).34 
This Article illustrates how current religious exemptions in-
volving LGBTQ child welfare are part of a much longer trajec-
tory of child welfare interventions into family life that rely on 
sexual deviance concepts to subordinate LGBTQ youth.35 This 
framing illuminates how religious exemptions involving LGBTQ 
child welfare encourage antiquated theories of sexual deviance 
to thrive in the child welfare system today, and permit reli-
giously motivated discrimination against LGBTQ youth who are 
already vulnerable when they come into contact with or enter 
the system.36 As this Article discusses, these religious exemp-
tions sustain and propagate sexual deviance concepts by substi-
tuting and equating the religious or moral views of child welfare 
actors with the best interests of youth regarding appropriate sex-
ual orientation and gender identity development and expres-
sion.37 Critically, difficulties in the child welfare system are pre-
cursors to difficulties in achieving independence after becoming 
 
 33. Jordan Blair Woods, LGBT Identity and Crime, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 667, 
679–95 (2017) (tracing the history of classifying certain sexualities and sexual 
practices as “deviant” and crimes in and of themselves). 
 34. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003) (discussing how 
laws that criminalize certain conduct, specifically of a sexual nature, enabled 
discrimination against lesbians and gay men in both the public and private 
spheres); Courtney G. Joslin, The Gay Rights Canon and the Right to Nonmar-
riage, 97 B.U. L. REV. 425, 435 (2017) (stressing that “[i]n the years between 
Bowers and Lawrence v. Texas, LGBT parents lost custody of their children, 
were fired from their jobs, and were made targets of private discrimination 
solely because of their sexual orientation” (citations omitted)); Melissa Murray, 
Rights and Regulation: The Evolution of Sexual Regulation, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 
573, 584–86 (2016) (discussing the regulation of sexual conduct in the civil do-
main post-Lawrence); see also sources cited infra note 259 and accompanying 
text. 
 35. See infra Part II. 
 36. See infra Part III.B. 
 37. MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., supra note 8, at 5 (noting 
that under religious exemptions, “[a]gencies would no longer need to make 
placement decisions based on the best interest of the child”). 
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emancipated (or “aging out”) of the system.38 Therefore, in addi-
tion to harming LGBTQ youth and undermining LGBTQ equal-
ity inside of the child welfare system, these forms of religiously 
motivated discrimination have short-term and long-term spillo-
ver effects that undermine LGBTQ equality in society at large.39 
In providing this different take on the conflict between reli-
gious liberty and LGBTQ child welfare, this Article urges 
against narrowly viewing the proliferation of broad religious ex-
emptions involving LGBTQ child welfare as mere backlash 
against the legalization of same-sex marriage.40 Rather, the in-
tellectual history that this Article excavates calls attention to a 
much deeper and darker history of religion and morality shaping 
laws and public institutions in ways that subordinate LGBTQ 
youth in need of help from the state. This richer context helps to 
provide a more nuanced and comprehensive account of the nor-
mative and practical consequences of subordinating LGBTQ 
equality to religion in the child welfare domain.41 It also reveals 
why it is important to include eliminating LGBTQ inequality in 
the child welfare system as part of a fully inclusive LGBTQ an-
tidiscrimination regime.42 
My view of the child welfare system as an institution of so-
cial control informs these arguments.43 I view the child welfare 
system as a social institution that regulates, socializes, and con-
trols youth in the most fundamental aspects of their lives, in-
cluding their personal identities. The regulating, socializing, and 
controlling forces of the child welfare system can harm youth in 
certain instances and protect them in others. Consistent with 
this idea, this Article illustrates how religious exemptions in-
volving LGBTQ child welfare enable spaces that regulate and 
 
 38. See Susanna R. Curry & Laura S. Abrams, Housing and Social Support 
for Youth Aging Out of Foster Care: State of the Research Literature and Direc-
tions for Future Inquiry, 32 CHILD & ADOLESCENT SOC. WORK J. 143, 144 (2015) 
(describing challenges associated with emancipation). 
 39. See infra Parts III and IV. 
 40. For instance, in a recent federal lawsuit challenging Michigan’s practice 
of using taxpayer funds to contract with private faith-based child placement 
agencies that rejected same-sex couples or individuals based on same-sex sta-
tus, the plaintiffs alleged that Michigan’s broad religious exemption law involv-
ing LGBTQ child welfare “is animated by disapproval of, or opposition to, same-
sex marriage.” Dumont v. Lyon, 341 F. Supp. 3d 707, 741 (E.D. Mich. 2018). 
 41. See infra Part IV. 
 42. See infra Part IV. 
 43. RONALD L. AKERS, DEVIANT BEHAVIOR: A SOCIAL LEARNING APPROACH 
8 (2d ed. 1977) (defining social control as “formal and informal ways society has 
developed to help ensure conformity to [social] norms”). 
  
2352 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:2343 
 
control the sexual orientations and gender identities of LGBTQ 
youth in stigmatizing and subordinating ways.44 
Scholars have taken a social control perspective to examine 
connections between inequality in the child welfare system and 
structural and cultural inequalities in broader society. For in-
stance, some scholars view the child welfare system as an insti-
tution of class control by which more powerful economic classes 
intervene in the family lives of working class and poor families 
in order to maintain economic dominance.45 Providing a different 
intersectional perspective, Professor Dorothy Roberts’s work 
powerfully describes the ways in which the child welfare system 
disciplines and controls low-income and poor mothers of color by 
keeping them under intense supervision and blaming them for 
family problems that are rooted in broader structural inequali-
ties connected to race, gender, and class.46 This Article contrib-
utes to this body of scholarship by illustrating how subordinat-
ing the LGBTQ identities of youth to religion and morality in the 
child welfare system facilitates and recreates broader LGBTQ-
based structural and cultural inequalities both inside and out-
side of the child welfare system.47 
At the onset, one caveat is in order. I fully recognize the im-
portance of religious liberty and the significant role of faith-
based organizations in providing child welfare services to fami-
lies, youth, and children.48 My point is that regardless of where 
one falls in the debate between religious liberty and LGBTQ 
equality, it is crucial to consider the contextual history surround-
ing these exemptions as well as the institutional settings in 
which these exemptions apply. In failing to do so, we are left with 
a distorted picture of the work that religious exemptions perform 
 
 44. See infra Part III. 
 45. See, e.g., JACQUES DONZELOT, THE POLICING OF FAMILIES (1979); 
CHRISTOPHER LASCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD: THE FAMILY BESIEGED 
(1977). 
 46. See Dorothy Roberts, Child Welfare and Civil Rights, 2003 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 171, 178 (2003) (“Contemporary notions of family liberty, typically inter-
preted as individual rights, can trace their roots to the effort to eradicate racial 
oppression.”). See generally DOROTHY E. ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE 
COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE (2002); Dorothy E. Roberts, Child Welfare’s Paradox, 
49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 881 (2007); Dorothy E. Roberts, Prison, Foster Care, 
and the Systemic Punishment of Black Mothers, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1474 (2012). 
 47. See infra Part IV. 
 48. Michael Howell-Moroney, Fostering Capacity: The Role of Faith-Based 
Congregations in the Child Welfare System in the United States, 32 INT’L J. PUB. 
ADMIN. 24, 28–30 (2009). 
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inside and outside of those institutions, and a limited under-
standing of the ways in which religious exemptions may jeopard-
ize LGBTQ equality in the current moment and moving ahead. 
In this regard, this Article lends support to Douglas NeJaime 
and Reva Siegel’s theory on the need for law and doctrine to con-
sider the material and dignitary harms that religious exemp-
tions inflict on third parties.49 Applying their third-party theory 
in this context, when determining whether to accommodate reli-
gion, law and doctrine should take into account the significant 
harms that broad religious exemptions involving LGBTQ child 
welfare would impose on LGBTQ youth who need help from the 
state.50 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I synthesizes and pre-
sents three major themes from historical theories of sexual devi-
ance. Parts II then draws on those themes to recast current reli-
gious exemptions involving LGBTQ child welfare along a much 
longer historical trajectory of child welfare interventions that 
subordinate LGBTQ youth based on sexual deviance concepts. 
Part III explains how broad religious exemptions in the LGBTQ 
child welfare context harm LGBTQ youth by sustaining and 
propagating sexual deviance concepts. Finally, Part IV discusses 
the implications of my historical and theoretical analysis for 
broader debates about religious liberty and LGBTQ equality, 
and for positioning the elimination of LGBTQ-based child wel-
fare inequality in wider efforts to achieve a fully inclusive 
LGBTQ antidiscrimination regime.  
I.  THREE THEMES OF SEXUAL DEVIANCE   
The debate over religious exemptions is largely framed in 
terms of the conflict between religious liberty and LGBTQ equal-
ity (and in particular, marriage equality).51 In the LGBTQ child 
 
 49. For a more detailed account of Douglas NeJaime and Reva Siegel’s pro-
posal on accommodating religion and third party harm see generally NeJaime 
& Siegel, supra note 15, at 2586–88; Douglas NeJaime & Reva Siegel, Con-
science Wars in Transnational Perspective: Religious Liberty, Third-Party 
Harm, and Pluralism, in THE CONSCIENCE WARS: RETHINKING THE BALANCE 
BETWEEN RELIGION, IDENTITY, AND EQUALITY 187–219 (Susanna Mancini & 
Michel Rosenfeld eds., 2018) [hereinafter NeJaime & Siegel, Conscience Wars 
in Transnational Perspective]; Douglas NeJaime & Reva Siegel, Religious Ac-
commodation, and Its Limits, in a Pluralist Society, in RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
AND LGBT RIGHTS: POSSIBILITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR FINDING COMMON 
GROUND 69–81 (Robin Fretwell Wilson & William N. Eskridge, Jr. eds., 2018) 
[hereinafter NeJaime & Siegel, Religious Accommodation]. 
 50. See infra Conclusion. 
 51. See NeJaime, supra note 15, at 1180–95 (describing the current debate 
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welfare context, however, religious exemptions are really a vehi-
cle for enduring anxiety about sexual deviance and attempts to 
shape and control the sexual orientations and gender identities 
of youth.52 This type of agenda has been renounced when articu-
lated explicitly to sustain criminal sodomy prohibitions or same-
sex marriage restrictions.53 In less obvious ways (namely, behind 
the veil of religious liberty), broad religious exemptions in the 
LGBTQ child welfare context enable outmoded sexual deviance 
concepts to thrive in the child welfare system today. 
This Part develops a theoretical foundation for these points. 
To do so, it synthesizes three major themes from historical theo-
ries of sexual deviance in the fields of criminology, psychology, 
and sociology. In Section A, I discuss how these theories charac-
terized the family as a vital institution in shaping sexual orien-
tation and gender identity development.54 In Section B, I explain 
how these theories assumed that the sexual orientations and 
gender identities of youth were not yet fully developed, and thus 
amenable to change.55 In Section C, I describe how these theories 
depicted LGBTQ adults as sexual predators and threats to 
youth.56 As will become clearer later in this Article, these themes 
had a role in justifying child welfare interventions in the past 
that subordinated LGBTQ youth, and continue to have a role in 
the more recent push for broad religious exemptions involving 
LGBTQ child welfare. 
Before discussing these themes in greater detail, it is neces-
sary to explain that these themes appear in two separate camps 
of sexual deviance theory: (1) psychological theories of deviance, 
and (2) sociological theories of deviance. The psychological theo-
ries primarily explain homosexuality and gender nonconformity 
in terms of individual personality traits and psychological fac-
tors.57 Unlike the psychological theories which look to individ-
 
over religious liberty and marriage equality for same-sex couples). 
 52. Lending further support to this point is Cliff Rosky’s work documenting 
how the concept of “fear of the queer child” historically emerged and still func-
tions as a key justification for anti-LGBTQ laws and policies. Clifford J. Rosky, 
Fear of the Queer Child, 61 BUFF. L. REV. 607, 618–35 (2013). 
 53. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (invalidating 
same-sex marriage restrictions); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) 
(invalidating the criminalization of private consensual sex between two adults). 
 54. See infra Part I.A. 
 55. See infra Part I.B. 
 56. See infra Part I.C. 
 57. Woods, supra note 33, at 689–90. 
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ual-level factors, the sociological theories of sexual deviance pri-
marily explain homosexuality and gender nonconformity in 
terms of environmental factors.58 
To understand the differences between these camps, a brief 
background on each is instructive. The psychological theories of 
deviance emerged in two waves. In the first wave, criminologists 
in the 1920s started to apply Sigmund Freud’s theory of psycho-
analysis to study crime. These scholars accepted Freud’s position 
that adult homosexuality was a non-harmful aberration of sex-
ual development and extended his view to challenge criminal 
sodomy laws against private consensual same-sex sex.59 None-
theless, as explained in this Part, these thinkers also adopted 
Freud’s position on the malleability of childhood sexual develop-
ment to advocate using psychotherapy on LGBTQ youth to 
change their sexual orientations and gender identities.60  
The introduction of “psychopathy” as a concept in the 1940s 
gave way to a second wave of psychological theories of sexual 
deviance.61 These theories defined homosexuality and gender 
nonconformity as mental diseases, and forms of sexual psychop-
athy more specifically.62 The writings of Sandor Rado, Edmund 
Bergler, Irving Bieber, and Charles Socarides were especially in-
fluential in pushing these pathological concepts,63 and their re-
search soon shaped a consensus within the U.S. psychiatric and 
 
 58. Id. at 693. 
 59. Id. at 685–87 (discussing psychoanalytic theories of sexual deviance). 
 60. See infra Part I.B. 
 61. Susan R. Schmeiser, The Ungovernable Citizen: Psychopathy, Sexual-
ity, and the Rise of Medico-Legal Reasoning, 20 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 163, 191–
206 (2008) (discussing the rise of psychopathology and the sex offender); Woods, 
supra note 33, at 687. In 1941, Hervey Cleckley released the first clinical profile 
of the psychopath, which included twenty-one character traits. HERVEY CLECK-
LEY, THE MASK OF SANITY: AN ATTEMPT TO REINTERPRET THE SO-CALLED PSY-
CHOPATHIC PERSONALITY 238–55 (1941). 
 62. Woods, supra note 33, at 688 (stating that many criminologists of the 
era viewed homosexuality as being “curable”). 
 63. EDMUND BERGLER, HOMOSEXUALITY: DISEASE OR WAY OF LIFE? 7 
(1956) (describing homosexuality as a “curable disease”); IRVING BIEBER ET AL., 
HOMOSEXUALITY: A PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY 303–04 (1962) (arguing that 
“[a]ny adaptation which is basically an accommodation to unrealistic fear is nec-
essarily pathologic” and homosexuality is a product of this fear); SANDOR RADO, 
ADAPTATIONAL PSYCHODYNAMICS: MOTIVATION AND CONTROL 212 (1969) (pos-
iting that when the “never recognized fear and resentment” of the opposite gen-
der’s sex orders becomes insurmountable, the individual turns to homosexual-
ity); CHARLES W. SOCARIDES, THE OVERT HOMOSEXUAL 35 (1968) (claiming that 
homosexuality, as a perversion, must be founded in “unconscious construc-
tions”). 
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mental health professions that homosexuality was a mental dis-
ease.64 Reflecting this consensus, the American Psychiatric As-
sociation included homosexuality as a disorder in the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) in 1952, 
where it remained until 1973.65 
Sociological theories of sexual deviance emerged after “sym-
bolic interactionism” gained popularity in the 1950s as the lead-
ing sociological framework to study questions of deviance.66 
From this perspective, scholars started to examine how people’s 
interactions within families, peer groups, and society shaped ho-
mosexuality and gender nonconformity.67 Although sociological 
theories of deviance fall into many camps,68 theories that rely on 
B.F. Skinner’s concept of operant conditioning were the most rel-
evant for the purposes of this Article.69 As this Part discusses, 
these theories characterized homosexuality and gender noncon-
formity as forms of sexual deviance rooted in improper socializa-
tion patterns, including within families.70  
This Article will later show that understanding the differ-
ences between these two camps helps to theorize what exactly is 
at stake in the debate over religious exemptions and LGBTQ 
child welfare. The historical analysis to follow will demonstrate 
that themes consistent with both camps have animated child 
welfare interventions in the past that subordinated LGBTQ 
youth.71 Understanding these differences also assists in theoriz-
 
 64. RONALD BAYER, HOMOSEXUALITY AND AMERICAN PSYCHIATRY: THE 
POLITICS OF DIAGNOSIS 28 (1981) (explaining Rado’s principle criticisms of 
Freud’s views on gender). 
 65. Id. at 39. 
 66. Woods, supra note 33, at 693. Symbolic interactionism focuses on how 
an individual’s interactions with the environment shape that individual’s self-
perception as well as their perception of society. HERBERT BLUMER, SYMBOLIC 
INTERACTIONISM: PERSPECTIVE AND METHOD 2–3 (1969). 
 67. Woods, supra note 33, at 693. 
 68. See AKERS, supra note 43, at 21–38 (providing a summary of different 
sociological theories of deviance). 
 69. B.F. SKINNER, SCIENCE AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 62–66 (1st ed. 1953) 
(outlining operant conditioning theory). Operant conditioning theory assumes 
that behaviors are more likely to occur in environments that reinforce those 
behaviors, and less likely to occur in environments that punish those behaviors. 
JACQUELINE B. HELFOTT, CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR: THEORIES, TYPOLOGIES AND 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 67 (2008) (defining operant conditioning). 
 70. Woods, supra note 33, at 694. 
 71. See infra Part III. 
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ing the multiple levels on which broad religious exemptions sub-
ordinate LGBTQ youth in the current moment.72 At the individ-
ual level, I argue these exemptions stigmatize LGBTQ youth by 
constructing them as “sexual deviants” on the basis of their sex-
ual orientations and gender identities. At the environmental 
level, I contend that these exemptions shape institutional spaces 
and living environments inside the child welfare system that ad-
here to and propagate traditional norms of sex, sexuality, and 
gender. In so doing, religious exemptions discourage LGBTQ 
youth inside the system from developing or expressing their sex-
ual orientations and gender identities. 
A. SPECIAL ROLE OF THE FAMILY 
The first major theme that emerges from historical theories 
of sexual deviance is emphasis on the family as a vital institution 
in shaping sexual orientation and gender identity development. 
As explained below, this emphasis on the family rationalized in-
tervening in parent-child relationships to ensure that youth ad-
hered to traditional norms of sex, sexuality, and gender. Some 
scholars even went as far as to argue that parents were the “pri-
mary makers of social deviates,” which in their view included 
LGBTQ people.73  
Given their different ideological assumptions, it is im-
portant to separate how psychological and sociological theories 
of sexual deviance characterized the role of the family in sexual 
orientation and gender identity development. Freudian theory 
largely shaped how scholars who studied deviance from a psy-
chological perspective viewed the family in this regard.74 Freud 
viewed homosexuality as a non-harmful aberration of sexual de-
velopment.75 He characterized homosexuality in both adult 
males and adult females as the product of arrested psychosexual 
 
 72. See infra Part IV. 
 73. Merl E. Bonney, Parents as the Makers of Social Deviates, 20 SOC. 
FORCES 77, 77 (1941). 
 74. See, e.g., FRANZ ALEXANDER & HUGO STAUB, THE CRIMINAL, THE 
JUDGE, AND THE PUBLIC: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 139–40 (Gregory Zilboorg 
trans., 1931) (discussing the work of Freud on homosexuality and familial roles); 
KATE FRIEDLANDER, A PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL APPROACH TO JUVENILE DELIN-
QUENCY 158–59 (1947) (describing male homosexuality with reference to Freud-
ian theory).  
 75. SIGMUND FREUD, THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY 4–5 
(James Strachey trans., 1962) (1905). 
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development caused by an unresolved Oedipal conflict (com-
monly referred to as the “Oedipus complex”).76 
Importantly, the family had a central role in Freud’s concep-
tion of the Oedipus complex. Consider his description of the Oe-
dipus complex in boys.77 Freud emphasized that during the Oe-
dipal phase of sexual development (which occurred between 
three to six years old),78 a boy developed intense erotic and emo-
tional attachments to his mother and began to harbor hostile 
feelings toward his father for interfering with that attachment.79 
The boy began to fear that the father would retaliate, and that 
this retaliation would take the form of castration.80 Fearing cas-
tration, the boy unconsciously abandoned the attachment to his 
mother, began to identify with his father, and sought sexual in-
timacy from other females.81 In Freud’s view, male homosexual-
ity was a manifestation of a boy’s unresolved Oedipus conflict.82 
He contended that fear of castration resulted in disgust toward 
 
 76. SIGMUND FREUD, Some Neurotic Mechanisms in Jealousy, Paranoia 
and Homosexuality (1922), reprinted in 18 THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COM-
PLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 221, 230–32 (James Stra-
chey ed., 1981) [hereinafter THE STANDARD EDITION].  
 77. SIGMUND FREUD, The Ego and the Id (1923), reprinted in 19 THE 
STANDARD EDITION, supra note 76, at 3, 31–32 [hereinafter FREUD, The Ego 
and the Id]. Freud also identified a parallel Oedipus complex for girls, which 
also emphasized family dynamics. Freud argued that during the Oedipal phase, 
a young girl initially had a strong connection to her mother. After discovering 
that she did not have a penis, the girl came to view herself as inferior and 
blamed her mother for her condition. The girl then began to develop a strong 
erotic and emotional attachment to her father, which took the form of fantasies 
that he would impregnate her. The girl viewed the child as a way to compensate 
for a missing penis. Eventually, the girl grew out of the Oedipal complex by 
viewing other men as potential impregnators. Freud argued that female homo-
sexuality stemmed from disappointment and trauma that a girl might have ex-
perienced in her attempt to turn to her father as a love object, which resulted 
the girl regressing to her mother and other women as love objects. SIGMUND 
FREUD, The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex (1924), reprinted in 19 THE 
STANDARD EDITION, supra note 76, at 173, 175–79 (describing the Oedipus com-
plex in girls) [hereinafter FREUD, The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex]. 
 78. Saul McLeod, Psychosexual Stages, SIMPLY PSYCHOL. (2017), https:// 
www.simplypsychology.org/psychosexual.html. 
 79. FREUD, The Ego and the Id, supra note 77, at 31–32. 
 80. FREUD, The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex, supra note 77, at 175. 
 81. SIGMUND FREUD, The Infantile Genital Organization: An Interpolation 
into the Theory of Sexuality (1924), reprinted in 19 THE STANDARD EDITION, su-
pra note 76, at 141, 145.  
 82. FREUD, supra note 76, at 230–32; see also SIGMUND FREUD, Group Psy-
chology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921), reprinted in 18 THE STANDARD EDI-
TION, supra note 76, at 69, 108 (linking male homosexuality with his Oedipus 
complex). 
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female genitalia,83 and that the boy unconsciously associated 
any female love object with his erotic attachment to his mother.84 
In the 1920s, criminologists started to apply Freud’s theory 
of human sexuality to study criminal behavior, including private 
consensual same-sex sex. These scholars adopted Freud’s posi-
tion that adult homosexuality was a non-harmful form of sexual 
deviance,85 and extended this idea to criticize criminal laws 
against private consensual same-sex sex.86 In spite of advocating 
for tolerance of adult homosexuality,87 however, these scholars 
took a very different position with regard to youth.  
As an example, consider the work of influential criminolo-
gists Franz Alexander and Hugo Staub. Alexander and Staub 
adopted Freud’s position on the non-harmful nature of adult ho-
mosexuality to criticize the legitimacy and effectiveness of crim-
inal punishment as a societal response to adult homosexuality.88 
At the same time, they relied on Freud’s concept of the Oedipus 
complex to conceptualize homosexuality as a problem of “child 
education.”89 They argued that changing “the sexual atmos-
phere” of the family and the use of psychoanalysis was the best 
way to prevent homosexuality (which at the time was conceptu-
alized to include gender nonconformity).90 In this regard, sexual 
deviance concepts informed their favorable outlook toward pub-
lic and private actors intervening in the family life of LGBTQ 
youth and using invasive psychological techniques to change 
their sexual orientations and gender identities. 
Scholars who drew on concepts of psychopathy to argue that 
homosexuality and gender nonconformity were mental diseases 
also emphasized the central role of the family in shaping sexual 
orientation and gender identity development.91 Consider Irving 
 
 83. Id. at 230. 
 84. Id. 
 85. ALEXANDER & STAUB, supra note 74, at 139–40 (characterizing homo-
sexuality as a “perversion” and noting that “homosexuality . . . does not threaten 
anybody’s rights”).  
 86. Id. at 142. 
 87. Id. at 143. 
 88. Id. at 139. 
 89. Id. at 143. 
 90. Id. The idea that “gender identity” was distinct from biological sex as-
signed at birth did not emerge until researchers advanced this idea in the 1950s. 
See Noa Ben-Asher, The Necessity of Sex Change: A Struggle for Intersex and 
Transsex Liberties, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 51, 82 (2006). 
 91. See, e.g., BIEBER ET AL., supra note 63, at 172, 303; BENJAMIN KARP-
MAN, THE SEXUAL OFFENDER AND HIS OFFENSES 151–54 (1954) (discussing 
prior psychological studies on the relationship between family circumstances 
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Bieber’s theory on male homosexuality.92 In the early 1950s, 
Bieber and his colleagues started a multi-year study of 106 gay 
men and 100 heterosexual men who were undergoing psychoan-
alytic treatment.93 They reported that 29 of the 106 gay men (or 
27%) became exclusively heterosexual after psychoanalysis.94 
The researchers reported strong histories of family dysfunction 
for the gay male subjects,95 and concluded that the “foundations 
of personality and psychopathology are set within the nuclear 
family.”96 Illustrating the central role of the family in their the-
ory, Bieber and his colleagues advanced a model of disturbed 
parent-child relations that in their view promoted homosexual-
ity.97  
Under this model, gay men were more likely to have a 
“[c]lose-binding-intimate” mother98 and a “detached-hostile” fa-
ther.99 For instance, many of the gay male subjects were their 
mother’s favorite child or closest confidant, and the two had a 
closeness that the researchers described as sexually provoca-
tive.100 Many of the gay male subjects also expressed open fear 
and hatred of their fathers, whose behaviors ranged from ne-
glectful to abusive.101 Bieber and his colleagues concluded that 
these disturbed parent-child relations promoted a fear of heter-
osexuality in youth, and in turn, promoted homosexuality.102 
Scholars who advanced sociological theories of deviance also 
stressed the role of the family in promoting homosexuality and 
gender nonconformity in youth. Looking to environmental fac-
tors, these theories examined how socialization patterns within 
 
and homosexuality); SOCARIDES, supra note 63, at 84–87. 
 92. BAYER, supra note 64, at 28–38. Bieber’s theory is worth discussing be-
cause it helped to shape a growing consensus in the psychology and mental 
health professions between the 1950s and 1970s that homosexuality was a men-
tal disease. See id. 
 93. BIEBER ET AL., supra note 63, at 20–24. 
 94. Id. at 282–83. 
 95. Id. at 213–18. 
 96. Id. at 311. Based on this idea, they examined dynamics within four cat-
egories of relationships inside the nuclear family: (1) between the subjects’ par-
ents; (2) between the subjects and mothers; (3) between the subjects and fathers; 
and (4) between the subjects and siblings, and relatedly, siblings and parents. 
Id. at 21. 
 97. Id. at 172. 
 98. Id. at 47. 
 99. Id. at 91. 
 100. Id. at 47. 
 101. Id. at 213. 
 102. Id. at 303. 
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the family contributed to homosexuality and gender noncon-
formity. Consider early articulations of Ronald Akers’ social 
learning theory of crime. Akers applied his influential theory in 
the early 1970s to explain deviant behaviors, including homosex-
ual conduct.103 Akers hypothesized that a person’s sex drive had 
biological origins, but social regulations and institutions (for ex-
ample, gender roles, marriage, and family) guided its strength 
and direction.104 He viewed “homosexual” and “heterosexual” as 
social roles constructed on the basis of specific sexual behaviors 
and gendered expectations.105  
Importantly, Akers posited that socialization patterns 
within the family could promote homosexuality in youth in two 
ways. First, parents might socialize their children in ways that 
directly reinforced sexually “deviant” behaviors.106 Second, and 
more commonly in his view, parents might socialize children in 
ways that rendered them unprepared to engage in heterosexual 
sexual behaviors.107 Akers argued that these socialization pro-
cesses caused a person to progress from “occasional initial expe-
riences” to “a stable pattern of deviant sexuality.”108 In this re-
gard, the regulating and socializing dynamics of the parent-child 
relationship shaped the construction of LGBTQ identities.   
In short, both psychological and sociological theories of sex-
ual deviance stressed the central role of the family in shaping 
sexual orientation and gender identity development. Related to 
this idea is the notion that the sexual orientations and gender 
identities of youth are not yet fully developed, and thus subject 
to change. The next Section discusses this theme in more depth. 
 
 103. AKERS, supra note 43, at 189–200. In the early articulation of his social 
learning theory, Akers dedicated an entire chapter in the first and second edi-
tions of his key work that articulated the theory, Deviant Behavior: A Social 
Learning Approach, to the topic of homosexuality. See RONALD L. AKERS, DEVI-
ANT BEHAVIOR: A SOCIAL LEARNING APPROACH 153–63 (1973); AKERS, supra 
note 43, at 189–200. Later editions of the work after sodomy bans lost force in 
the 1970s no longer include this chapter on homosexuality, reflecting a broader 
societal shift away from viewing homosexuality as a form of sexual deviance. 
See, e.g., RONALD L. AKERS, SOCIAL LEARNING AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE: A GEN-
ERAL THEORY OF CRIME AND DEVIANCE (2009). 
 104. AKERS, supra note 43, at 181. 
 105. Id. at 189. 
 106. Id. at 183. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 193. 
  
2362 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:2343 
 
B. MALLEABILITY OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER 
IDENTITY DEVELOPMENT 
The second major theme that emerges from historical theo-
ries of sexual deviance is the idea that the sexual orientations 
and gender identities of youth are not yet fully developed and 
thus subject to change. With regard to psychological theories of 
sexual deviance, scholarly perspectives on this issue can be 
traced again to Freud’s views. Freud identified five stages of psy-
chosexual development: the oral stage (zero to eighteen months 
old), the anal stage (eighteen months to three years old), the 
phallic stage (three to six years old), the latency stage (six to 
twelve years old) and the genital stage (twelve years old and 
older).109 Freud viewed homosexuality in adults as a non-harm-
ful product of an arrested psychosexual development during the 
third, phallic (also called Oedipal) stage.110 
As discussed previously, some scholars of deviance applied 
Freudian theory to advocate using psychotherapy on LGBTQ 
youth in attempts to change their sexual orientations or gender 
identities.111 Revisit criminologists Alexander and Staub, who 
viewed homosexuality as a problem of “child education” and rec-
ommended using psychoanalytic techniques to alter the course 
of an LGBTQ youth or child’s sexual development.112 Freud’s po-
sition that youth were still progressing through the stages of 
psychosexual development informed Alexander and Staub’s rec-
ommendation.113 
Scholars who disagreed with Freud to define homosexuality 
and gender nonconformity as mental diseases also emphasized 
the malleability of adolescent and childhood sexual develop-
ment. On this point, revisit the research of Bieber and his col-
leagues from the 1950s.114 In reporting their findings, the re-
searchers stressed that the period between sixteen and twenty-
one years old was characterized by an increase in heterosexual 
 
 109. SIGMUND FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (1933), 
reprinted in 22 THE STANDARD EDITION, supra note 76, at 3, 98–99; McLeod, 
supra note 78. 
 110. See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text. 
 111. See supra Part I.A. 
 112. ALEXANDER & STAUB, supra note 74, at 143.  
 113. Id. (applying Freud’s idea of the Oedipus complex to advocate for using 
psychotherapy on youth to prevent homosexuality). 
 114. To recap, Bieber and his colleagues reported that out of the 106 gay men 
in their study who underwent psychoanalysis, twenty-nine of them (or twenty-
seven percent) became exclusively heterosexual. BIEBER ET AL., supra note 63, 
at 282–83. 
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drive.115 Based on this idea, they concluded that the optimal pe-
riod to redirect a person’s sexual orientation or gender identity 
development through psychoanalysis fell between late adoles-
cence and young adulthood.116 
Sociologists who studied deviance also emphasized the mal-
leability of adolescent and childhood sexual orientation and gen-
der identity development, but in different ways. Rather than 
conceptualizing homosexuality as a feature of individual psy-
chology or personality, sociologists viewed “homosexual” and 
“heterosexual” as social roles rooted in gendered expectations of 
appropriate sexual behavior.117 Scholars who applied operant 
conditioning concepts examined how reinforcing and punishing 
stimuli toward homosexual conduct motivated individuals to 
progress from an isolated same-sex sexual experience toward co-
hesive forms of LGBTQ identity.118 
To illustrate this point, revisit Akers’ social learning theory 
of crime. Akers posited that sexual conditioning starts very early 
in life.119 In his view, people’s first same-sex sexual experience 
usually occurs during pre-adolescent years in the setting of in-
nocent play between boys and between girls.120 He argued that 
the sex training given to children, especially from their parents, 
could lead to deviance.121 In his view, although sexual condition-
ing continues throughout one’s life, after “habit sets in . . . the 
individual tends not to experiment [or] change.”122 This, in com-
bination with a person’s immersion in “homosexual subcultures” 
 
 115. Id. at 282. 
 116. Id. 
 117. See, e.g., AKERS, supra note 43, at 189 (“Heterosexual and homosexual 
are distinguishable social roles, but people are not inherently one or the 
other . . . .”); Mary McIntosh, The Homosexual Role, 16 SOC. PROBS. 182, 182 
(1968) (conceptualizing homosexuality as a social label and not a condition of 
specific individuals); see also Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards 
Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REV. 915, 
941–46 (1989) (providing an overview of prior social-constructionist research on 
homosexuality). 
 118. AKERS, supra note 43, at 193–94. 
 119. Id. at 180.  
 120. Id. at 194.  
 121. Id. at 184. 
 122. Id. at 180. 
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(for instance, gay bars or gay and lesbian advocacy organiza-
tions),123 set a process into motion in which Akers argued a per-
son progresses from an isolated same-sex experience to a “stable 
pattern of deviant sexuality.”124 
C. SEXUAL PREDATOR STEREOTYPES 
The two evaluated themes so far are inward looking in the 
sense that they focus on the internal dynamics of families to en-
sure that youth adhere to traditional norms pertaining to sex, 
sexuality, and gender. The third and final relevant theme—the 
stereotyping of LGBTQ adults (and in particular, adult gay men) 
as sexual predators—is outward looking. It works by stigmatiz-
ing and preventing “deviant” actors from interfering with the 
“appropriate” sexual orientation and gender identity develop-
ment of youth. Scholars have described how these stereotypes 
date back to premodern times and have motivated a range of 
anti-LGBTQ laws and policies over time.125 This Article will 
later explain that these stereotypes have facilitated laws and 
policies that excluded LGBTQ adults from providing supportive 
foster and adoptive homes for unwanted LGBTQ youth in the 
child welfare system.126 
With regard to the deviance literature, stereotypes of 
LGBTQ adults as sexual predators are especially prominent in 
psychological theories of deviance.127 Even scholars who em-
braced Freud’s views about the non-harmful nature of adult ho-
mosexuality included these stereotypes in their theories. Con-
sider the work of criminologist Kate Friedlander.128 In applying 
Freudian theory to examine juvenile delinquency and crime, 
Friedlander criticized the notion that homosexuality in adults 
posed an inherent threat to society.129 Friedlander, however, dis-
tinguished “active homosexuals” from “passive homosexuals.”130 
In her view, active homosexuals included adult men who desired 
 
 123. Id. at 197–99. 
 124. Id. at 193. 
 125. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Promo Homo: The Sedimentation of 
Antigay Discourse and the Channeling Effect of Judicial Review, 75 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1327, 1329 (2000); Rosky, supra note 52, at 618–32. 
 126. See infra Part III.B. 
 127. Woods, supra note 33, at 688. 
 128. FRIEDLANDER, supra note 74, at 151–77 (discussing sexual perversions 
and offenses). 
 129. Id. at 152 (noting that “homosexuals . . . show no other sign of inferior-
ity and are often useful members of the community”). 
 130. Id. at 159. 
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to have sex with young boys and assumed the “male rôle [sic]” 
(namely, the “top”) during those encounters.131 Conversely, pas-
sive homosexuals included adult men who desired the love of an-
other man because of unloving relationships with their fathers, 
and assumed the “female rôle [sic]” (namely, the “bottom”) dur-
ing those encounters.132 In evaluating the clinical history of an 
“active homosexual,” Friedlander stressed that “people with a 
disturbance of this kind” would pose a “danger of seducing young 
boys.”133 
Scholars who disagreed with Freud’s conclusion that homo-
sexuality was a non-harmful aberration of sexual development 
applied concepts of psychopathy to demonize lesbian and gay 
adults as sexual predators and threats to children. For instance, 
J. Paul De River, a prominent forensic psychiatrist during the 
1960s, characterized gay men and lesbians as psychopaths.134 De 
River argued that homosexuality was the result of “early seduc-
tion into . . . practice,”135 illustrating the central role of sexual 
predator stereotypes in his explanation of homosexuality. He 
further claimed the “psychic trauma” of boys who are seduced 
into homosexuality is so severe that it leaves an “imprint” on 
their minds.136 Based on this idea, De River recommended inva-
sive and harmful electric shock therapy for homosexuals (at least 
two shocks per week), which in his experience could purportedly 
“bring about a complete change in the pattern of thought.”137   
 
*** 
In sum, this Part synthesized three major themes from his-
torical theories of sexual deviance: the central role of the family 
in shaping sexual orientation and gender identity development, 
the purported malleability of sexual orientation and gender iden-
tity development, and the demonization of LGBTQ adults as sex-
ual predators and threats to youth. This Article now draws on 
these themes to recast broad religious exemptions involving 
LGBTQ child welfare along a much longer historical trajectory 
of child welfare interventions that rest on sexual deviance con-
cepts to subordinate LGBTQ youth. This theoretical recasting 
 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 162. 
 134. J. PAUL DE RIVER, CRIME AND THE SEXUAL PSYCHOPATH 77–107 (1958). 
 135. Id. at 326. 
 136. Id. at 83. 
 137. Id. at 97. 
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reveals how religious exemptions in the LGBTQ child welfare 
context enable outmoded sexual deviance concepts to thrive in 
the child welfare system today. 
II.  THE PATH TO RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS IN LGBTQ 
CHILD WELFARE   
With sodomy decriminalization starting in the late 1960s,138 
and more recent advances in LGBTQ rights, one might assume 
that historical theories of sexual deviance no longer shape laws 
that affect LGBTQ people. Challenging this idea, this Part exca-
vates a historical trajectory of child welfare interventions that 
rest on sexual deviance concepts to subordinate LGBTQ youth. 
In developing this trajectory, the analysis lays the groundwork 
for a new theoretical frame to understand the current push for 
religious exemptions involving LGBTQ child welfare. This Arti-
cle argues that we should understand the current push for these 
exemptions as the latest point on this trajectory. 
The historical trajectory is divided into four periods that 
center on different controversies and developments surrounding 
the treatment of LGBTQ youth in the child welfare system. Sec-
tion A looks at the time period before the 1970s when private 
consensual same-sex sex was criminalized. Section B dives into 
coordinated efforts to match unwanted LGBTQ youth who could 
not find homes with gay and lesbian foster parents during the 
1970s. Section C discusses the backlash following this time pe-
riod and considers agency policies and legislation banning gay 
and lesbian foster parents between the 1980s and 1990s. Finally, 
Section D analyzes the more recent litigation and nonlitigation 
strategies of LGBTQ advocacy organizations during the 2000s 
and early 2010s intended to improve the treatment of LGBTQ 
youth in the child welfare system. 
At the outset, it is important to recognize that family law 
scholars have looked to some of these periods in order to histori-
cize and theorize legal developments surrounding parental 
recognition for lesbians and gay men. Although there is overlap 
with those issues, the trajectory below has a different focus in 
that it places LGBTQ youth in the child welfare system at the 
center of the analysis. As will become clear, some child welfare 
responses to LGBTQ youth embraced sexual deviance concepts 
whereas others challenged them. This back and forth reveals the 
 
 138. ESKRIDGE, supra note 32, at 136–94 (discussing sodomy law reform 
starting in the 1960s). 
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nonlinear and multifaceted ways in which sexual deviance con-
cepts have informed child welfare interventions over time in or-
der to pressure LGBTQ youth to conform to traditional norms of 
sex, sexuality, and gender.  
A. BEFORE THE 1970S: THE CRIMINALIZATION ERA 
Until the early 1970s, criminal laws against private consen-
sual sex and gender nonconforming conduct stigmatized LGBTQ 
people as criminals, and left them vulnerable to arrest and in-
carceration in almost every state.139 In addition, the growing 
professional consensus between the 1940s and 1960s that homo-
sexuality was a mental disease justified “sexual psychopath” 
laws.140 These laws constructed LGBTQ people (gay men in par-
ticular) as psychopaths, and allowed for their confinement, per-
haps indefinitely, in mental health or correctional facilities.141 
Interactions between these two areas of legislation put many 
LGBTQ people who came to the attention of the state into a bind: 
either accept being stigmatized as criminals and potentially face 
incarceration, or assume the label of being mentally ill and un-
dergo invasive and harmful psychotherapy and psychiatric in-
terventions.142 
Published studies during the criminalization era illustrate 
how this interplay between criminal and medical norms—which 
critically, rested on sexual deviance concepts—affected LGBTQ 
youth who came into contact with the state.143 Consider psychi-
atrist Lewis J. Doshay’s acclaimed study on male juvenile sex 
offenders, published in 1943.144 The study sample consisted of 
 
 139. See id.; Bennett Capers, Cross Dressing and the Criminal, YALE J.L. & 
HUMAN. 1, 8–9 (2013) (discussing the history of ordinances prohibiting cross-
dressing). 
 140. Estelle B. Freedman, Uncontrolled Desires: The Response to the Sexual 
Psychopath, 1920–1960, in FEMINISM, SEXUALITY, AND POLITICS 121, 126–27, 
130–34 (2006). 
 141. Id. at 132. 
 142. BAYER, supra note 64, at 28–29. 
 143. See, e.g., LEWIS J. DOSHAY, THE BOY SEX OFFENDER AND HIS LATER CA-
REER (1943); Oscar B. Markey, A Study of Aggressive Sex Misbehavior in Ado-
lescents Brought to Juvenile Court, 20 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 719, 723 (1950) 
(presenting the findings of one psychological study of juvenile sex delinquency 
in which most of the male subjects were charged with homosexuality); Patricia 
O’Neal et al., A Psychiatric Evaluation of Adults Who Had Sexual Problems as 
Children: A Thirty-Year Follow-Up Study, 19 HUM. ORG. 32, 33 (1960) (present-
ing findings of a similar study). 
 144. DOSHAY, supra note 143. 
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256 males between the ages of 7- and 16-years-old who were ad-
judicated delinquent for sex offenses, and then referred to the 
New York City Children Court’s clinics for treatment.145 Subjects 
were separated into two groups: (1) young males who had com-
mitted only sex-related offenses, and (2) young males who had 
committed a mix of both sex-related and non-sex-related of-
fenses.146 Detailed case histories in the former group revealed 
how youth had been adjudicated delinquent and funneled into 
the treatment clinics for simply engaging same-sex sexual con-
duct.147 
Doshay’s study found that the young males who had only 
committed sex-related offenses had much lower rates of recidi-
vism than the mixed-offense group.148 Based on these findings, 
Doshay concluded that juvenile male sex delinquency was “self-
curing,” assuming that state responses resulted in proper shame 
and guilt.149 This conclusion, in combination with the fact that 
the delinquent subjects were funneled into treatment clinics, re-
flected the assumption that sexual orientation and gender iden-
tity development during adolescence and childhood was subject 
to change.150 Further illustrating how the family was viewed as 
a site for state intervention,151 Doshay recommended shaming 
boys by bringing their families into juvenile court or clinic hear-
 
 145. Id. at 1. The male juvenile sex delinquents were treated between the 
years of 1928 and 1933, and the investigators followed up with the subjects a 
minimum of six years after their treatment with the clinic. Id. 
 146. Id. at 1–3. 
 147. Id. at 75 (listing sodomy as an offense); see also, e.g., id. at 96–97 (in-
troducing the case of G.T., an eleven-year-old subject who committed the offense 
of perversions with adults and adolescents); id. at 97–98 (detailing the case of 
A.G., a fifteen-year-old subject who had been adjudicated delinquent for “engag-
ing in homosexual practices as a means of livelihood”); id. at 98–99 (describing 
the case of C.S., a fifteen-year-old subject who had committed the offense of sod-
omy on younger siblings and other children); id. at 139–40 (discussing the case 
of J.P., a nine-year-old subject who was adjudicated delinquent for engaging in 
various “perverted practices with an elderly degenerate” as well as with older 
boys in the neighborhood). 
 148. Id. at 153–54. 
 149. Id. at 168. Notably, Doshay argued that psychoanalytic treatment was 
not an effective way to treat juvenile delinquency and advocated for better sex 
education instead. Id. at 175–76. 
 150. This assumption is consistent with the second major theme of sexual 
deviance discussed supra Part I.B. Further illustrating this relationship, 
Doshay served as a psychiatrist at the New York City Children’s Court. See 
DOSHAY, supra note 143, at cover page. 
 151. This assumption is consistent with the first major theme of sexual de-
viance discussed supra Part I.A. 
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ings and revealing their illicit sexual conduct to family mem-
bers.152 
Literature dedicated to LGBTQ youth in the child welfare 
system during the criminalization era is sparse. A closer look at 
the available published studies, however, reveals that some child 
welfare agencies during this period refused to serve LGBTQ 
youth.153 LGBTQ youth were also commonly kicked out of foster 
families and group homes when family members or staff discov-
ered their LGBTQ identities.154 Other LGBTQ youth who lived 
in foster families or group homes were forced to undergo psycho-
therapy to change their sexual orientations or gender identi-
ties.155 These youth were often considered more appropriately 
handled within training schools, mental health institutions, and 
secure detention facilities, as opposed to the child welfare sys-
tem.156 Thus, the picture of care that emerges from these studies 
is, to the extent that LGBTQ youth were able to receive help from 
the child welfare system, they had to subordinate their sexual 
orientations and gender identities to do so.  
 
 152. DOSHAY, supra note 143, at 168. 
 153. Bruce Voeller & James Walters, Gay Fathers, 27 FAM. COORDINATOR 
149, 154 (1978) (discussing how gay youth in the foster care system were often 
viewed as “problem” children and that many prospective foster parents did not 
want them); Lucinda Franks, Homosexuals as Foster Parents: Is New Program 
an Advance or Peril?, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1974, at 55 (quoting an office director 
for a state social welfare agency that state child-care agencies “generally refused 
to deal with homosexual adolescents”). 
 154. See, e.g., Franks, supra note 153, at 47 (discussing the creation of a new 
program pairing gay male adults with homeless youth who identified as “homo-
sexuals” and had been rejected by their parents and group homes); Robert Joffee 
& John Mintz, N.J. Officials Find Gay Foster Parents for Gay Teenagers, TREN-
TON TIMES (Nov. 26, 1979), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/ 
1979/11/26/nj-officials-find-gay-foster-parents-for-gay-teen-agers/c778037f 
-6f43-49c4-a0a6-a7a08c9581a5/?utm_term=.26c3ea011c5a (quoting a repre-
sentative from the N.J. Department of Human Services who stressed that some 
heterosexual foster parents cannot deal with the challenges of openly gay foster 
youth and that some of those youth “don’t function well” with kids in other foster 
families). 
 155. See, e.g., Lauretta Bender & Samuel Paster, Homosexual Trends in 
Children, 11 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 730, 742 (1941) (discussing the results 
of a study that examined the use of psychotherapy on gay youth who lived in 
foster care). 
 156. John M. Flackett & Gail Flackett, Criswell House: An Alternative to In-
stitutional Commitment for Juvenile Offender, 34 FED. PROB. 30, 34 (1970) (not-
ing that one training school regularly housed “youths with homosexual prob-
lems”); Sidney Tarachow, The Disclosure of Foster-Parentage to a Boy, 94 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 401, 403–04 (1937) (discussing a gay male foster youth who had 
been confined in juvenile detention for engaging in same-sex conduct). 
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To illustrate these points more concretely, consider a 1937 
study of 250 male adolescents who were admitted to a training 
school for juvenile delinquents.157 One of the subjects, R.W., was 
a black gay male youth who had bounced in and out of foster care 
since the age of two.158 When he turned fourteen, his foster par-
ents started to suspect that he was engaging in same-sex sex—
which the study described as his behavioral “problem.”159 R.W. 
sought the company of older men, was effeminate in his speech 
and mannerisms, avoided athletics, and enjoyed dramatics and 
choir singing.160 The study described that his foster parents tried 
“kindly argument and persuasion without avail to direct him 
sexually.”161 R.W. ran away several times from his foster family 
until he was eventually committed to the training school.162 The 
researchers looked to the role of the family in sexual orientation 
development to account for his “sexual inversion.”163 Specifically, 
the study stressed connections between his complicated family 
history and behavioral “problem.”164 
Barriers to parental recognition for lesbians and gay men 
during the criminalization era compounded the problems for 
LGBTQ youth in the child welfare system. With sodomy and sex-
ual psychopath laws in effect, it was outside the realm of possi-
bility for lesbians or gay men to openly foster or adopt.165 These 
exclusions were consistent with broader challenges that lesbian 
 
 157. Tarachow, supra note 156. The study examined connections between 
boys’ behavioral problems and disclosure that their parents were foster—and 
not their biological—parents. Id. at 401. 
 158. Id. at 403. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. This is consistent with the first and second major themes of sexual 
deviance described in supra Parts I.A. and I.B. 
 162. Tarachow, supra note 156, at 403. 
 163. Id. at 404. This is consistent with the first major theme of sexual devi-
ance described in supra Part I.A. 
 164. Tarachow, supra note 156, at 404. 
 165. WENDELL RICKETTS, LESBIANS AND GAY MEN AS FOSTER PARENTS 6 
(reprt. 2008) (noting that open lesbian and gay foster homes have existed since 
the early- to mid-1970s); David S. Chambers & Nancy D. Polikoff, Family Law 
and Gay and Lesbian Family Issues in the Twentieth Century, 33 FAM. L.Q. 523, 
535 (1999) (noting that issues of lesbian and gay adoption and foster parenting 
first surfaced in the 1970s); Voeller & Walters, supra note 153, at 153 (noting 
that “[s]creening out homosexuals is commonplace in foster care and adoption 
cases”). 
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and gay parents faced in family courts involving custody dis-
putes.166 Judges regularly embraced stereotypes of lesbian and 
gay adults as sexual predators and threats to children in order 
to deem them unfit parents,167 and often relied on sodomy stat-
utes to do so.168 Importantly, these barriers to parental recogni-
tion limited LGBTQ youths’ access to out-of-home child welfare 
placements that were supportive of their sexual orientations and 
gender identities.169 As discussed in Section B, legal develop-
ments in the early 1970s that eased restrictions on lesbian and 
gay foster parenting helped to increase some LGBTQ youth’s ac-
cess to supportive placements.  
B. THE 1970S: EARLY SEXUAL ORIENTATION MATCHING 
In the early 1970s, private non-profit organizations and pub-
lic child welfare agencies started to place LGBTQ teenagers 
whose families no longer wanted them, and who had no other 
viable placement options in the child welfare system, with 
openly lesbian and gay foster parents.170 These new practices of 
 
 166. Nan D. Hunter & Nancy D. Polikoff, Custody Rights of Lesbian Mothers: 
Legal Theory and Litigation Strategy, 25 BUFF. L. REV. 691 (1976) (discussing 
legal challenges surrounding custody for lesbian mothers); Joslin, supra note 34 
(noting that LGBT parents lost custody of their children between the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s decisions in Bowers v. Hardwick and Lawrence v. Texas); Brian 
Miller, Gay Fathers and Their Children, 28 FAM. COORDINATOR 544, 546 (1979) 
(discussing custody cases in which gay fathers lost custody over their children, 
especially sons, because courts feared that the fathers would turn their children 
gay); D. Kelly Weisberg, Alternative Family Structures and the Law, 24 FAM. 
COORDINATOR 549, 551–52 (1975) (discussing cases in which courts awarded 
custody to fathers over lesbian mothers who lived with their same-sex partners). 
 167. This is consistent with the third major theme of sexual deviance de-
scribed supra Part I.C. 
 168. Courts commonly relied on sodomy statutes to deny custody to lesbian 
and gay parents well into the 1980s and 1990s, especially in states that had not 
decriminalized private consensual same-sex sex. Diana Hassell, The Use of 
Criminal Sodomy Laws in Civil Litigation, 79 TEX. L. REV. 813, 831 (2001) (“The 
assumption that a gay parent is committing the crime of sodomy motivates 
many decisions concerning custody.”); see, e.g., Constant A. v. Paul C.A., 496 
A.2d 1, 5 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985); Stroman v. Williams, 353 S.E.2d 704, 706 (S.C. 
Ct. App. 1987); Dailey v. Dailey, 635 S.W.2d 391, 391 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981); Roe 
v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 691 (Va. 1985). 
 169. Stephen F. Morin & Stephen J. Schultz, The Gay Movement and the 
Rights of Children, 34 J. SOC. ISSUES 137, 145 (1978) (discussing the lack of 
foster care placements for gay adolescents). 
 170. See sources cited supra note 154; see also Marie-Amélie George, Agency 
Nullification: Defying Bans on Gay and Lesbian Foster and Adoptive Parents, 
51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 363, 375 (2016) (“Although national debates over 
lesbian and gay foster parents erupted in the mid-1980s, social service agencies 
had been placing children in the homes of openly gay men and women since the 
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sexual orientation matching emerged alongside other calls to 
match parents with youth in the child welfare system on the ba-
sis of race, ethnicity, and religion.171 As this Section explains, 
new pressures on the foster care system and contested norms of 
sexual deviance framed the scholarly and public discourse over 
these new child welfare approaches. 
The early 1970s was a critical period in the history of the 
U.S. foster care system. During the 1960s and 1970s, the number 
of youth in foster care nearly doubled to almost 500,000.172 As 
foster care placements surged, legal scholars and commentators 
 
mid-1970s.”); Nancy D Polikoff, Lesbian and Gay Couples Raising Children: The 
Law in the United States, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: 
A STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 153, 157 (Robert 
Wintemute & Mads Andenaes eds., 2001) (describing how the National Gay 
Task Force worked with New York City child welfare agencies to develop a net-
work of gay foster homes for homeless gay teenagers); cf. Nancy D. Polikoff, 
Resisting “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” in the Licensing of Lesbian and Gay Foster Par-
ents: Why Openness Will Benefit Lesbian and Gay Youth, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 
1183, 1184 (1997) [hereinafter Polikoff, Resisting “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”] (“The 
most obvious connection between lesbian and gay youth and foster parents is 
the importance of the availability of gay and lesbian foster parents to provide 
homes for gay teenagers who need acceptance and support for their journey into 
adulthood.”). 
 171. See, e.g., NAT’L ASS’N OF BLACK SOC. WORKERS, POSITION STATEMENT 
ON TRANS-RACIAL ADOPTIONS 1 (1972), https://www.nabsw.org/resource/ 
collection/E1582D77-E4CD-4104-996A-D42D08F9CA7D/NABSW_Trans 
-Racial_Adoption_1972_Position_(b).pdf (taking a “vehement stand against the 
placement of Black children in white homes for any reason”); see also Gregory 
A. Horowitz, Note, Accommodation and Neutrality Under the Establishment 
Clause: The Foster Care Challenge, 98 YALE L.J. 617, 623–24 (1989) (noting de-
bates during the 1950s and 1970s over the constitutionality and practical wis-
dom of religion matching in adoption). Although the validity of identity match-
ing is beyond the scope of this Article, there is a robust scholarly debate over 
race-matching practices in adoption and foster care. See, e.g., R. Richard Banks, 
The Color of Desire: Fulfilling Adoptive Parents’ Racial Preferences Through 
Discriminatory State Action, 107 YALE L.J. 875, 904–08 (1998) (arguing that 
facilitative accommodation practices in adoptions should be treated as racial 
classifications and subjected to strict scrutiny); Ralph Richard Banks, The Mul-
tiethnic Placement Act and the Troubling Persistence of Race Matching, 38 CAP. 
U. L. REV. 271, 274 (2009) (arguing for an “expansive interpretation of the [Mul-
tiethnic Placement Act’s] prohibition of race matching”); Elizabeth Bartholet, 
Where Do Black Children Belong? The Politics of Race Matching in Adoption, 
139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163 (1991) (arguing against race-matching practices in 
adoptions); Katie Eyer, Constitutional Colorblindness and the Family, 162 U. 
PA. L. REV. 537 (2014) (discussing constitutional issues arising from race-based 
practices in family law). 
 172. NORA S. GUSTAVSSON & ELIZABETH A. SEGAL, CRITICAL ISSUES IN 
CHILD WELFARE 92 (1994); Leroy H. Pelton, Welfare Discrimination and Child 
Welfare, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1479, 1488 (1999). 
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lodged wholesale critiques of the foster care system.173 Experts 
attributed this growth to significant changes in federal funding 
for child welfare programs, which in their view provided finan-
cial incentives for states to remove children from their biological 
families and place them in foster care.174 Overburdened child 
welfare agencies started to look for alternative approaches to 
handle the crisis, especially for youth who were difficult to place 
through foster care or adoption.175 
In addition to these new pressures on the foster care system, 
the first open practices of sexual orientation matching in the 
1970s emerged in the context of shifting ideas surrounding 
LGBTQ people and deviance in the criminal and medical do-
mains. In the early 1970s, a wave of states started to decrimi-
nalize private consensual same-sex sex and repeal their sexual 
psychopath laws.176 The dominant view that homosexuality was 
a mental disease also began to lose force,177 as illustrated by the 
American Psychiatric Association’s removal of homosexuality 
from the DSM in 1973.178  
This shifting terrain opened discursive space to conceive of 
LGBTQ youth as worthy of support in child welfare settings, and 
 
 173. See, e.g., Robert H. Mnookin, Foster Care—In Whose Best Interest?, 43 
HARV. EDUC. REV. 599 (1973) (critiquing the discretionary authority afforded to 
judges in removing “neglected” children to foster care); Michael S. Wald, State 
Intervention on Behalf of “Neglected” Children: A Search for Realistic Stand-
ards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985 (1975) (suggesting a narrowing of the neglect juris-
diction of juvenile courts); Michael S. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of “Ne-
glected” Children: Standards for Removal of Children from Their Homes, 
Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and Termination of Parental 
Rights, 28 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1976) (discussing, in part, the inadequacy of ex-
isting laws regarding removal of children into the foster care system). 
 174. Martin Guggenheim, The Foster Care Dilemma and What to Do About 
It: Is the Problem that Too Many Children Are Not Being Adopted out of Foster 
Care or that Too Many Children Are Entering Foster Care?, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. 
L. 141, 142–43 (1999). Specifically, critics argued that the revisions allocated 
ample funds that followed youth into foster care placements, but little funds for 
services to prevent foster care placements or to reunite children with their bio-
logical families after being placed in foster care. Id. at 142. 
 175. See, e.g., Franks, supra note 153 (quoting a state social worker describ-
ing that gay teenagers usually cannot be placed in the child welfare system). 
 176. BAYER, supra note 64, at 40 (discussing the repeal of sexual psychopath 
laws); ESKRIDGE, supra note 32, at 136–94 (discussing sodomy law reform). 
 177. Growing empirical research discounting the idea that homosexuality 
was a mental disease as well as mobilization within early lesbian and gay social 
movements contributed to this shifting legal terrain. Woods, supra note 33, at 
699–700. 
 178. BAYER, supra note 64, at 40. 
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not juvenile delinquents or mentally ill sexual deviants who de-
served medical treatment and social exclusion.179 These shifting 
norms of deviance also created room for psychology and mental 
health professionals to conceive of lesbian and gay adults as suit-
able foster and adoptive parents, and not sexual predators. Illus-
trating this point, the American Psychological Association 
adopted a resolution in 1976 that took the position that sexual 
orientation should not be the “sole or primary variable consid-
ered in custody or placement cases.”180   
In 1973, the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force (NGLTF) 
started the first coordinated effort to place vulnerable LGBTQ 
youth between the ages of twelve and seventeen with lesbian and 
gay foster parents.181 Most of the placed youth were unwanted 
by their families, shunned by child welfare agencies, and re-
jected by heterosexual foster parents.182 After the creation of the 
NGLTF program, the director of the New York State Board of 
Welfare publicly acknowledged that child welfare agencies in the 
state generally refused services to lesbian and gay youth.183 At 
least thirty youth were placed with lesbian and gay foster par-
ents within the first year of the creation of the program.184  
Scholars who advanced psychological theories of sexual de-
viance to define homosexuality and gender nonconformity as 
mental diseases publicly denounced the NGLTF program.185 
They specifically emphasized the malleability of sexual develop-
ment during adolescence and childhood,186 and warned against 
the dangers of labeling youth as lesbian or gay too quickly in 
light of this malleability.187 For instance, Charles Socarides, 
whose research contributed to the dominant consensus in the 
psychology and mental health profession between the 1950s and 
 
 179. See, e.g., Franks, supra note 153, at 47 (noting that some psychothera-
pists called early gay foster homes “a spectacular advance” in “understanding 
homosexuality as a sexual preference rather than as a disease”); id. (quoting a 
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1970s that homosexuality was a mental disease,188 publicly cri-
tiqued the program.189 In stressing the malleability of adolescent 
sexual development, Socarides referenced his research finding a 
fifty percent success rate for gay youth who underwent psycho-
therapy and purportedly returned to heterosexuality.190 
Soon after the NGLTF program began, several public child 
welfare agencies started to place unwanted LGBTQ youth with 
lesbian and gay foster parents.191 For instance, in 1975, the New 
Jersey Department of Human Services set up the first “gay fos-
ter home” in the state.192 Notably, this approach emerged in the 
context of broader debates about criminalizing private consen-
sual sex within the state. In 1973, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court held that its state sodomy law was unconstitutionally 
vague as applied to married couples, but not unmarried intimate 
partners.193 Five years later, however, the state legislature re-
pealed its sodomy law, which lifted prohibitions against private 
consensual same-sex sex.194  
In the same year of the legislative repeal, a local newspaper 
published a story on new “gay foster homes” in the state.195 Chal-
lenging deviant stereotypes of lesbian and gay adults as sexual 
predators,196 a spokesperson for the New Jersey Department of 
Human Services stressed that there was “no indication that a 
gay foster parent is more likely to sexually abuse a child than a 
heterosexual foster parent.”197 At the same time, the story re-
vealed how acceptance of gay foster homes hinged on the idea 
that the sexual orientations of the placed youth had already crys-
tallized, and thus were not malleable.198 In this regard, the ac-
ceptance of gay foster homes occurred in the broader context of 
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cabining how far the second previously discussed theme of sex-
ual deviance—the malleability of sexual orientation and gender 
identity development—applied. For instance, in commenting on 
the new program, prominent child psychiatrist Aaron H. Esman 
noted that for “young adolescents, the pattern of sexual orienta-
tion might not be fixed, and that kind of placement might tend 
to fix it as homosexual.”199 Esman acknowledged, however, that 
the new approach made sense for the youth who had already 
been placed in light of their “established homosexual orienta-
tion.”200  
Some judges rejected placing LGBTQ youth with lesbian or 
gay foster parents in areas where sexual orientation matching 
was a possible option. One well-publicized case from Washington 
in 1975 illustrates how sexual deviance concepts shaped the ra-
tionales of judges at the time.201 The Washington case involved 
a sixteen-year-old gay male teenager named Pat who had 
bounced between several child welfare placements, and was 
eventually sent to juvenile detention for behavioral and “sexual 
problems” (specifically, engaging in same-sex sexual conduct).202 
While in juvenile detention, Pat was forced to undergo psycho-
therapy to change his sexual orientation.203 When it became 
clear that juvenile detention was not leading to successful out-
comes, staff at the detention center began a search to place Pat 
in a gay foster home.204 Two gay men in a committed relationship 
agreed to serve as Pat’s foster parents.205  
Two juvenile parole officers, a social worker, a psychiatrist, 
and a psychologist all testified before the court in favor of the 
placement.206 Pat also preferred to live with the gay couple.207 
Pat’s father, however, objected to the placement.208 He rooted his 
objections in the second major theme of deviance, arguing before 
the court that there would not be “much chance [Pat would] come 
out ‘straight’” if he was placed with the gay couple.209 
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In denying the placement, the judge accepted the father’s 
argument about the malleability of adolescent sexual develop-
ment.210 The judge further stressed that the state’s child welfare 
laws and policies embraced “[h]istorical and traditional concepts 
of parent models and the family role.”211 Based on these ideas, 
the judge concluded that substituting the gay couple for the tra-
ditional family model did “violence not only to the literal defini-
tion of who are parents but offends the traditional concept of 
what a family is.”212  
The judge’s reasoning also showcased inconsistencies be-
tween sodomy decriminalization and the treatment of LGBTQ 
youth in the child welfare domain.213 Washington had repealed 
its sodomy law earlier that year.214 Nonetheless, the judge em-
phasized that it was not the state’s role to “encourage and foster 
deviant behavior in its wards.”215 Illustrating how sexual devi-
ance concepts facilitated the subordination of LGBTQ youth in 
the child welfare domain, the judge concluded that Pat “should 
be encouraged to behave normally regardless of his sexual orien-
tation.”216 The judge further denounced the use of state institu-
tions “to foster or promote personal and highly questionable phi-
losophies and life styles that do not have general acceptance in 
the community.”217 
Thus, the first coordinated practices of sexual orientation 
matching in foster care challenged deviant conceptions of 
LGBTQ identity in order to provide unwanted LGBTQ youth 
safe and stable homes. As Section C discusses, however, a wave 
of legal restrictions on lesbian and gay foster and adoptive par-
enting soon emerged in response to this greater acceptance of 
LGBTQ identity in the child welfare domain.  
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 213. The judge stressed that “[l]egal acceptance or social tolerance of homo-
sexuals does not equate with the state’s sanctioning such relationships in every 
facet of human existence,” especially when the welfare of children was involved. 
Id. 
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C. THE 1980S–1990S: LEGAL BATTLES OVER LESBIAN AND GAY 
PARENTING 
Scholars describe the 1980s and 1990s as a significant pe-
riod for litigation surrounding parental recognition for same-sex 
couples.218 During this period, LGBTQ advocates pursued new 
litigation strategies in order to persuade courts to recognize the 
parenting rights of lesbians and gay men.219 In what scholars 
refer to as the “lesbian baby boom,”220 same-sex couples started 
to have children through donor insemination and adoption, and 
many same-sex couples continued to raise children from prior 
opposite-sex relationships.221 By the late 1980s, there were ap-
proximately 4 million lesbian and gay parents in the United 
States, and between 8 and 10 million children being raised in 
households with lesbian or gay parents.222 
Alongside this litigation for parental recognition emerged 
another set of legal disputes involving lesbian and gay parenting 
rights that directly implicated LGBTQ youth in the child welfare 
system. By the 1970s, child welfare agencies in several states 
had made arrangements for LGBTQ youth whose families did 
not want them and had no viable placement options in the child 
welfare system to live in foster homes with lesbian and gay par-
ents.223 These new foster arrangements paved the way for child 
welfare agencies to expand placements with lesbian and gay par-
ents to include non-LGBTQ youth.224 As explained below, back-
lash against this expansion centered on sexual deviance concepts 
and engendered new state laws and policies that restricted les-
bians and gays from parenting through foster care and adop-
tion.225 
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In 1985, the Massachusetts Department of Social Services 
(DSS) adopted a new policy that significantly limited the ability 
of lesbians and gay men to become foster or adoptive parents.226 
The impetus for the new restriction grew out of a public contro-
versy surrounding two young brothers, ages two- and three-
years-old, who had been placed and then removed from the care 
of a gay foster couple.227 DSS had granted the gay couple a foster 
license after eleven months of evaluation and six weeks in train-
ing.228 The brothers had been physically abused, and their birth 
mother approved the placement.229 Two weeks after the place-
ment, a local newspaper printed a story that included criticisms 
from neighbors and community members.230 Soon after the story 
was published, DSS removed the brothers from the gay couple’s 
home and placed them with another foster family.231 
To understand the connections between sexual deviance 
concepts and the new DSS policy, it is important to first consider 
introduced legislation that preceded the DSS policy. Initially, 
the Massachusetts House of Representatives passed a bill by a 
112 to 28 vote that prohibited placing any child in the care of 
another through adoption, guardianship, or foster care whose 
“sexual preference threatens the psychological or physical well-
being of the child.”232 Notably, “homosexual preference” was the 
only sexual preference defined as such a threat in the bill.233 
Critics argued that, in characterizing lesbians and gays as 
threats to children, the law entrenched stereotypes of prospec-
tive lesbian and gay parents as child molesters into law,234 illus-
trating connections between the law and sexual deviance con-
cepts. 
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Before the state senate voted on the bill, however, DSS mod-
ified its placement policy. The new policy created a hierarchy 
that prioritized placing youth who came into contact with DSS 
in “traditional family settings.”235 Although not a categorical 
ban, critics argued that the new policy would, in effect, prevent 
lesbians and gay men from parenting through foster care or 
adoption.236 Those concerns soon materialized. After the policy 
took effect, reports surfaced of DSS administrators and supervi-
sors discouraging social workers from placing youth in foster 
homes with lesbian or gay parents.237 DSS administrators also 
publicly admitted that the new policy was commonly understood 
to ban lesbian and gay foster parenting.238  
A less discussed aspect of the new policy was its effect on 
unwanted LGBTQ youth with no viable placement options in the 
child welfare system. LGBTQ advocates expressed this concern 
in their public criticisms of the policy, both with regard to 
LGBTQ youth who were already placed in “gay foster homes” as 
well as future LGBTQ youth who would benefit from those place-
ments.239 When asked about these issues, then-governor Michael 
Dukakis publicly responded that the state would create new 
group homes to serve unwanted LGBTQ youth.240  
Although the state never built these group homes, the gov-
ernor’s suggestion itself has meaningful ties to sexual deviance 
concepts. As discussed previously, group homes and other forms 
of congregate care were typically reserved for youth who had be-
havioral problems and could not be successfully placed into fam-
ilies through foster care or adoption.241 Perceptions of LGBTQ 
youth as sexual deviants contributed to them being driven out of 
their homes, rejected by foster families, and funneled into group 
homes and other forms of congregate care.242 The failures of in-
stitutionalization in addressing the needs of displaced LGBTQ 
adolescents was a key factor that influenced private organiza-
tions and public child welfare agencies to experiment with “gay 
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foster homes.”243 To the extent that these group homes were to 
be built after the new DSS policy took effect, however, it was 
unclear how the state would address the previously acknowl-
edged shortcomings of institutionalizing LGBTQ youth who 
needed help from the state.  
In 1987, two years after the Massachusetts DSS issued its 
new policy, New Hampshire became the first state to pass a stat-
ute that banned lesbians and gay men from both foster and adop-
tive parenting.244 Similar to the situation in Massachusetts, the 
impetus for the ban related to a local news story that reported 
that the state’s child welfare agency had licensed a gay man as 
a foster parent.245 The new law created an irrebuttable presump-
tion that lesbians and gay men were unfit to serve as foster par-
ents, adoptive parents, or to receive licenses to operate day care 
centers.246 In this regard, the third major theme of deviance in-
volving the demonization of lesbian and gay adults as threats to 
children came to define the best interests of children under the 
law.247  
Notably, the statutory ban applied to adolescents, including 
unwanted LGBTQ youth whose only viable placement option 
was with lesbian or gay foster parents. Representative Mildred 
Ingram, who was the driving force behind the law, stated pub-
licly that a gay foster parent in New Hampshire had been found 
with a teenager in his care, and that she “wouldn’t allow that in 
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the state . . . as long as [she had] breath.”248 After the ban took 
effect, it was unclear how LGBTQ youth—and in particular 
LGBTQ youth who could not be successfully placed into families 
through foster care or adoption—would receive help from the 
state. 
Moreover, the New Hampshire ban offers additional insight 
into the ways in which sexual deviance concepts shaped the rea-
soning of courts that tackled sexual orientation issues in child 
welfare at the time. After passing its version of the ban, the state 
House of Representatives asked the Supreme Court of New 
Hampshire to issue an advisory opinion on the constitutionality 
of the ban.249 The New Hampshire high court upheld the ban on 
both equal protection and substantive due process grounds.250 As 
explained below, sexual deviance concepts informed the court’s 
reasoning on both claims.  
With regard to its equal protection analysis, the state high 
court stressed that sexual orientation was not a suspect classifi-
cation, and in applying rational basis review, concluded that 
providing appropriate role models for youth was a legitimate 
state interest.251 The high court emphasized that environmental 
influences—and in particular, dynamics within parent-child re-
lationships—could promote homosexuality in youth.252 In this 
regard, the high court’s conclusion rested on the first and second 
major themes in sociological theories of sexual deviance: that ho-
mosexuality was a product of one’s environment and socializa-
tion patterns within the family in particular.253 
The high court’s substantive due process analysis rested on 
different sexual deviance concepts. In 1986, one year before the 
state legislature passed the statutory ban on lesbian and gay fos-
ter and adoptive parenting, the U.S. Supreme Court decided 
Bowers v. Hardwick.254 Hardwick upheld the constitutionality of 
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Georgia’s sodomy law insofar as it criminalized private consen-
sual same-sex sex.255 The Court reasoned that there was no fun-
damental right to homosexual sodomy because there was “[n]o 
connection between family, marriage, or procreation on the one 
hand and homosexual activity on the other.”256 In so doing, the 
Court defined intimacy between same-sex partners as outside 
the scope of the “traditional family” concept. Applying rational 
basis review, the Court reasoned that public morality provided a 
sufficient basis for criminalizing sodomy,257 including private 
consensual same-sex sex.258   
Scholars have described how Hardwick paved the way for 
legislators and judges to reference the constitutionality of crimi-
nalizing private consensual same-sex sex to rationalize and jus-
tify discrimination against LGBTQ people in several civil law do-
mains, including family law.259 The New Hampshire high court’s 
decision illustrates this very point. The court relied on Hardwick 
to uphold the foster and adoption parenting ban on substantive 
due process grounds.260 It emphasized that there was no funda-
mental right to engage in consensual homosexual sodomy be-
cause there was no connection between same-sex sexual conduct 
and family, marriage, and procreation.261  
As these states adopted laws and policies that rested on sex-
ual deviance concepts and stigmatized LGBTQ people in the 
child welfare domain, a few states took the opposite path by en-
acting the first child welfare policies that afforded antidiscrimi-
nation protection on the basis of sexual orientation. In 1982, 
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New York issued the first statewide agency policy that prohib-
ited denying prospective parents for adoption solely on the basis 
of their sexual orientation.262 Soon after, New Jersey, New Mex-
ico, and Vermont adopted similar policies.263 
Although these early antidiscrimination policies focused on 
parenting, the challenges of unwanted LGBTQ youth in the child 
welfare system had a central role in animating and justifying 
these measures. Consider the early New York antidiscrimina-
tion policy mentioned above. The agency guidelines explicitly 
recognized that LGBTQ teenagers were among the youth wait-
ing for adoption in the state, and further discussed the difficul-
ties in placing those teenagers through adoption.264 The guide-
lines stressed that lesbian and gay parents offer these youth the 
best opportunity for a supportive home life and long term 
bonds,265 and referenced the recent success with gay foster 
homes in New Jersey to support this point.266 In this regard, pro-
tecting lesbian and gay parents from discrimination in foster 
care and adoption served a means to ensure that LGBTQ youth 
had better access to supportive homes in the child welfare sys-
tem. 
As legal battles over lesbian and gay parenting continued 
into the 1990s, grassroots organizations took the lead in system-
atically studying and documenting the challenges that LGBTQ 
youth faced in the child welfare system. In 1994, a joint task 
force consisting of New York City’s Child Welfare Administra-
tion and the Council of Family and Child Caring Agencies con-
ducted the first-ever comprehensive survey of LGBTQ youth in 
a major child welfare system.267 The study found that one hun-
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dred percent of the youth respondents had been verbally har-
assed, and seventy percent had been physically assaulted, for be-
ing LGBTQ inside the child welfare system.268 Moreover, sev-
enty-eight percent were removed or ran away from foster 
placements after experiencing hostility or mistreatment for be-
ing LGBTQ.269 More than half (fifty-six percent) reported living 
on the street at some point because they felt safer living in home-
lessness than in out-of-home placements.270 
Although the study did not inspire immediate reforms,271 it 
helped to build an early body of empirical knowledge on the sys-
temic challenges that LGBTQ youth faced in the child welfare 
system.272 Further contributions to this body of research set the 
stage in the 2000s for national LGBTQ advocacy organizations 
to push for comprehensive LGBTQ child welfare reform, which 
Section D turns to discuss. 
D. 2000S–EARLY 2010S: BEYOND SEXUAL ORIENTATION 
MATCHING 
In the early 2000s, comprehensive child welfare reform 
emerged as a priority among national LGBTQ advocacy organi-
zations.273 This Section focuses on two aspects of these new mo-
bilization efforts. First, it discusses how calls for child welfare 
reform went beyond embracing sexual orientation matching to 
address the deeper structural and cultural challenges that 
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LGBTQ youth faced in the child welfare system. Advocates spe-
cifically critiqued the ways in which LGBTQ youth were stigma-
tized and treated as sexual deviants. Second, this Section dis-
cusses how these new mobilization efforts facilitated a wave of 
LGBTQ-related antidiscrimination laws, regulations, and poli-
cies in child welfare. Many of these measures addressed discrim-
ination beyond the same-sex parenting context to prohibit sexual 
orientation and gender identity discrimination against LGBTQ 
youth. Importantly, many religious exemption laws involving 
LGBTQ child welfare operate against the backdrop of these an-
tidiscrimination measures (as Part III will discuss).  
In 2001, Lambda Legal (the nation’s largest LGBTQ legal 
rights organization) coordinated with youth advocates to conduct 
a fourteen state survey of policies and practices surrounding 
LGBTQ youth in foster care.274 The study reported that none of 
the fourteen states had agency policies prohibiting discrimina-
tion on the basis of sexual orientation or required training for 
caseworkers, foster care staff, or foster parents on the sensitive 
and appropriate handling of LGBTQ youth in the child welfare 
system.275 In addition, only Los Angeles and New York City had 
group facilities specifically designed for LGBTQ youth.276  
The study report made several LGBTQ-youth-centered rec-
ommendations for reform that cut much deeper into the child 
welfare system than providing for sexual orientation matching 
in foster care. First and foremost, the report recommended that 
states adopt statewide antidiscrimination policies that prohibit 
sexual orientation discrimination in the child welfare system.277 
It further recommended that states mandate and provide train-
ing for caseworkers, foster care staff, and foster parents to sen-
sitively and adequately address the needs of LGBTQ foster 
youth.278 Moreover, it recommended that states offer programs 
and services that specifically address the needs of LGBTQ foster 
youth (for instance, LGBTQ-specific group homes, designating 
caseworkers or child welfare staff as LGBTQ liaisons, etc.).279 
That same year, a commission sponsored by the Lesbian and 
Gay Youth Project of the Urban Justice Center conducted the 
first comprehensive study of LGBTQ youth in the juvenile justice 
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system.280 The study findings revealed connections between the 
problems that LGBTQ youth faced in the child welfare and the 
juvenile justice systems. Specifically, the study found that rejec-
tion from foster homes contributed to LGBTQ youth homeless-
ness, and that survival crimes while homeless (such as sex work 
and theft) fueled the entry of LGBTQ youth into the juvenile jus-
tice system.281 
This emerging body of empirical research—and in particu-
lar, the connections that it drew between the child welfare and 
the juvenile justice systems—informed both litigation and non-
litigation reform strategies of attorneys and LGBTQ advocacy 
organizations.282 Critically, the focus on both systems in their 
reform strategies illustrated that advocates conceptualized the 
need for comprehensive LGBTQ-related child welfare reform as 
part of a broader need to address how public systems were failing 
and further stigmatizing LGBTQ youth as “deviants.”  
With regard to litigation, attorneys in the early 2000s 
brought several lawsuits on behalf of LGBTQ youth in the child 
welfare and the juvenile justice systems.283 Attorneys who filed 
these lawsuits advanced constitutional and statutory claims, in-
cluding the constitutional right to safety, equal protection, free-
dom of speech, and access to non-discrimination protections.284 
Although cases were met with mixed success,285 these litigation 
strategies occurred during a significant historical moment sur-
rounding the treatment of LGBTQ people under criminal law.  
In 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Lawrence v. Texas, 
which invalidated criminal laws against private consensual sex 
between adults, including adult same-sex partners.286 Both Jus-
tice Kennedy’s majority and Justice O’Connor’s concurring opin-
ions emphasized that the stigma of sodomy laws extended be-
yond the criminal domain and encouraged discrimination 
against lesbians and gay men in the civil domain.287 The Court 
in Lawrence, however, stressed that its decision did not apply to 
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cases involving minors.288 This limiting principle left open ques-
tions about how Lawrence applied to LGBTQ minors, including 
how the decision might apply to address the discrimination that 
sodomy prohibitions facilitated against LGBTQ youth in the civil 
child welfare domain.289 
Given the limitations of Lawrence and litigation strategies 
more generally to achieve systemic change for LGBTQ youth in 
the child welfare system, national advocates also pursued non-
litigation strategies.290 Two nationally collaborative projects, 
both launched in 2002, laid the groundwork for these non-litiga-
tion approaches.291 
The first project, entitled “Fostering Transitions,” was a 
joint initiative of the Child Welfare League of America (the na-
tion’s largest child welfare organization) and Lambda Legal.292 
The initiative sought to improve outcomes for LGBTQ youth in 
the child welfare and the juvenile justice systems by spreading 
awareness about the challenges that they faced in those sys-
tems.293 The initiative had several components, including offer-
ing expertise and guidance to state and local officials, creating 
local task forces, supporting legislative reform, assembling a na-
tional advisory network of child welfare professionals, conduct-
ing workshops and presentations at national and regional con-
ferences, and offering toolkits to assist social workers to support 
LGBTQ youth and families.294 Illustrating the relationship be-
tween the initiative’s work and pushback against sexual devi-
ance concepts, the initiative stressed that condemning or pathol-
ogizing LGBTQ youth in the child welfare system for 
appropriately exploring or expressing their sexual orientations 
and gender identities sends the message to those youth that they 
are “deviant, immoral, or mentally ill.”295 
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The second national collaboration, entitled the “Model 
Standards Project,” was a joint initiative of Legal Services for 
Children and the National Center for Lesbian Rights.296 Also 
created in 2002, the Model Standards Project sought to develop 
model agency policies and best practices to improve outcomes for 
LGBTQ youth in the child welfare and the juvenile justice sys-
tems.297 In underscoring the need for reform, the project stressed 
that many LGBTQ youth enter the child welfare system simply 
because they are perceived as “deviant or perverse.”298 With re-
gard to child welfare reforms, the project placed primary empha-
sis on creating an inclusive organizational culture in which 
LGBTQ youth are accepted and treated equally.299  
To accomplish this goal, the project advanced several 
LGBTQ-youth-centered recommendations: (1) that child welfare 
agencies, departments, and institutions adopt written policies 
prohibiting harassment and discrimination on the basis of sex-
ual orientation and gender identity;300 and (2) that staff, caregiv-
ers, and service providers be required to undergo cultural com-
petency training on meeting the needs of LGBTQ youth in the 
child welfare system.301 The project also stressed the need to pro-
mote healthy adolescent development in LGBTQ youth.302 It rec-
ommended that (1) agencies adopt policies and practices that 
support and encourage healthy, safe, and age-appropriate sexual 
and gender exploration and expression;303 (2) child welfare ac-
tors allow gender nonconforming youth to dress in accordance 
with their gender identity and to be addressed by their preferred 
names and pronouns;304 and (3) LGBTQ youth be actively in-
volved in selecting their out-of-home placements, and that child 
welfare actors who shape placement decisions be aware of the 
needs of specific LGBTQ youth before making those decisions.305 
 
 296. SHANNAN WILBER ET AL., THE MODEL STANDARDS PROJECT: CREATING 
INCLUSIVE SYSTEMS FOR LGBT YOUTH IN OUT-OF-HOME CARE 2 (2006), http:// 
www.nclrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Model_Standards_Project_ 
article.pdf. 
 297. Id. 
 298. Id. at 1. 
 299. Id. at 2. 
 300. Id. at 3. 
 301. Id. at 2. 
 302. Id. at 3–4. 
 303. Id. at 3. 
 304. Id. at 4. 
 305. Id. at 5. 
  
2390 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:2343 
 
In 2003, one year after the Model Standards Project con-
vened, California passed the first state law that prohibited dis-
crimination against LGBTQ youth in the foster care system—
the California Foster Care Nondiscrimination Act.306 The Cali-
fornia law imposed sexual orientation and gender identity anti-
discrimination mandates on a range of child welfare actors (for 
example, child welfare agencies, providers, staff, and foster par-
ents) and required that information about those mandates be in-
cluded in child welfare trainings.307 Model Standards Project 
staff worked with communities in California to implement an 
early draft of its proposed standards.308 These early reform ef-
forts helped to create a blueprint to implement those strategies 
nationwide when the Model Standards Project released the final 
standards in 2006.309 
Both collaborative projects continued their efforts on a na-
tional scale during the mid-2000s and early 2010s.310 During this 
period, the landscape of state laws, regulations, and policies ad-
dressing LGBTQ child welfare changed dramatically. Between 
2003 and 2015, over twenty-five states passed or revised laws, 
regulations, or agency policies that prohibited discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity against youth 
in the child welfare system.311 Many of these policies addressed 
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the treatment of LGBTQ youth beyond sexual orientation 
matching to ensure that child welfare actors did not discriminate 
against, intimidate, or degrade LGBTQ youth. As Part III dis-
cusses, the recent proliferation of religious exemptions involving 
LGBTQ child welfare emerged in the context of these growing 
antidiscrimination measures. 
III.  THE TURN TO RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS IN LGBTQ 
CHILD WELFARE   
So far, this Article has described a historical trend (and 
pushback against this trend) of child welfare interventions into 
family life that rest on sexual deviance concepts to control the 
sexual orientation and gender identity development and expres-
sion of LGBTQ youth. Recently, several states have enacted 
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broad religious exemption laws that allow the religious or moral 
views of key actors in the child welfare system to guide the na-
ture of the services they provide, even if their views denounce 
LGBTQ people.312 Because most of these laws emerged after 
Obergefell v. Hodges,313 one might narrowly interpret this prolif-
eration as a direct response to marriage equality. Advocates on 
both sides of the religious liberty and LGBTQ equality debate 
have advanced this view.314  
The analysis in this Part, however, offers an LGBTQ-child-
centered analysis of the issue and explains why we should also 
understand the push for these exemptions as the latest point on 
the historical trajectory described above. From this perspective, 
recent religious exemptions involving LGBTQ child welfare are 
a vehicle for long-enduring anxieties about sexual “deviance” 
and youth who veer from traditional norms of sex, sexuality, and 
gender. Section A analyzes how broad religious exemptions 
viewed in the frame of social control and sexual deviance func-
tion to subordinate LGBTQ youth in the child welfare system. 
Section B explores the harms that these exemptions create for 
LGBTQ youth, and the implications for “crossover youth”315 
within the juvenile and criminal justice systems in particular. 
A. RELIGION, SOCIAL CONTROL, AND SEXUAL DEVIANCE 
A useful starting point to illustrate the connections between 
religion, social control, and sexual deviance concepts is the long 
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history of criminal sodomy laws.316 In medieval England, the 
Church and ecclesiastical courts enforced prohibitions against 
sodomy.317 The Church viewed homosexual acts as a sin punish-
able by torture or by death.318 The power of the Church declined 
during the English Reformation, after King Henry VIII trans-
ferred the powers of the ecclesiastical courts to the crown 
courts.319 In 1533, the Reformation Parliament temporarily en-
acted the 1533 Act of Henry VIII, which made the crime of “bug-
gery” punishable by death.320 The 1533 Act later served as a 
model for sodomy prohibitions in the U.S. colonies during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.321  
In its sodomy law jurisprudence, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has recognized the role of religion in shaping criminal laws 
against private consensual same-sex sex,322 and the effects of 
those criminal prohibitions on lesbians and gay men.323 Revisit 
Bowers v. Hardwick, the 1986 decision which upheld the consti-
tutionality of Georgia’s criminal sodomy law.324 In applying ra-
tional basis review, the Court concluded that morality was a suf-
ficient justification for the sodomy ban.325 On one hand, Justice 
White’s majority opinion framed the morality interest in majori-
tarian, not religious, terms—namely the presumed belief that a 
majority of Georgia voters viewed homosexuality as “immoral 
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and unacceptable.”326 On the other hand, appeals to religion ap-
peared at several noteworthy points of the case.  
For instance, in its brief before the Court, the state empha-
sized that traditional Judeo-Christian values proscribed same-
sex sex.327 The state’s position formed the basis of Chief Justice 
Burger’s concurrence, which stressed that the condemnation of 
same-sex sex “is firmly rooted in Judeao-Christian [sic] moral 
and ethical standards.”328 Justice Blackmun’s dissent critiqued 
the state’s reliance on religion, stressing that the state’s argu-
ment that traditional Judeo-Christian values proscribe same-sex 
sex “cannot provide an adequate justification” for the law.329 Jus-
tice Blackmun further stressed that the fact that some religious 
groups condemn a behavior does not give the state a “license to 
“impose their judgments on the entire citizenry.”330  
When the Court revisited sodomy prohibitions seventeen 
years later in Lawrence v. Texas, the role of religion in justifying 
sodomy laws came to the fore again.331 The Court in Lawrence 
overruled Hardwick and invalidated Texas’ law criminalizing 
consensual and private “homosexual conduct.”332 Justice Ken-
nedy’s majority opinion in Lawrence emphasized the stigmatiz-
ing effects of criminal sodomy laws against lesbians and gay men 
in both the public and the private realms.333 
With regard to religion, Justice Kennedy criticized Chief 
Justice Burger’s “sweeping references” to Judeo-Christian moral 
and ethical values in his Hardwick concurrence.334 Justice Ken-
nedy further stressed that the Chief Justice had ignored oppos-
ing authorities that did not condemn same-sex sex.335 Justice 
Kennedy’s firm rejection of upholding the constitutionality of 
sodomy laws on religious grounds has even led some scholars 
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and commentators to view Lawrence as an implied Establish-
ment Clause case, and not purely a substantive due process 
case.336  
From a social control perspective, criminal sodomy laws are 
a useful comparator to reveal connections between religion and 
sexual deviance concepts in the context of LGBTQ child welfare. 
Many scholars conceptualize the criminal law as a tool of social 
control that regulates individual behavior in society.337 From 
this perspective, the relationship between religion, sexual devi-
ance concepts, and criminal sodomy laws is not exceptional. Ra-
ther, this relationship is consistent with a broader pattern of re-
ligion shaping institutions of social control in ways that define 
particular conduct or individuals who do not fit traditional 
norms of sex, sexuality, and gender as “deviant.”  
Conceptualizing the child welfare system as an institution 
of social control allows us to see similarities between the control-
ling functions of criminal sodomy laws and child welfare laws 
that subordinate LGBTQ youth. Broad religious exemptions in-
volving LGBTQ child welfare function as tools of social control 
by substituting and equating the religious or moral views of child 
welfare actors with the best interests of youth regarding “appro-
priate” sexual orientation and gender identity development.338 
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In so doing, these exemptions facilitate and sustain child welfare 
spaces that denounce LGBTQ youth and pressure them to con-
form to traditional norms of sex, sexuality, and gender. As dis-
cussed previously, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Law-
rence stressed how the stigmatizing effects of criminal sodomy 
laws encouraged discrimination against lesbians and gay men in 
both the public and private realms.339 In allowing religiously-
motivated discrimination based on antiquated sexual deviance 
concepts to thrive in child welfare settings today, religious ex-
emptions enable the exact type of discrimination that Lawrence 
rebuked.  
To make these points more concrete, consider the debate 
over the California Foster Care Nondiscrimination Act.340 The 
California law took effect in 2004 and was the first state law to 
prohibit discrimination against LGBTQ youth in the foster care 
system on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity.341 
Opponents critiqued the law on religious liberty grounds.342 In 
this regard, the debate over the California law foreshadowed 
conflicts in the current moment between religious liberty and 
LGBTQ child welfare. One important difference, however, is that 
the law took effect years before marriage equality first came to 
California.343 With married same-sex couples not at the center of 
attention, the debate over the law provides a clear picture of how 
religious exemptions are connected to anxieties about LGBTQ 
identity and youth. 
Two entities led the opposition to the California law. First, 
the Committee on Moral Concerns raised religious conscientious 
objections, which explicitly relied on sexual deviance concepts.344 
The Committee characterized LGBTQ identity as “sexual orien-
tation, and gender identity difficulties,” and argued that the law 
required foster parents and group home staff to agree that those 
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 342. See infra notes 344–50 and accompanying text. 
 343. In May 2008, the Supreme Court of California first interpreted the Cal-
ifornia state constitution as requiring marriage equality. In re Marriage Cases, 
183 P.3d 384, 402 (Cal. 2008). For a more detailed discussion of the In re Mar-
riage Cases, see William N. Eskridge, Foreward: The Marriage Cases—Revers-
ing the Burden of Inertia in a Pluralist Constitutional Democracy, 97 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1785 (2009). 
 344. Foster Care Anti-Discrimination Act: Hearing on A.B. 458 Before the 
Assemb. Comm. on Human Servs., 2003 Leg., 2003–2004 Sess. 6 (Cal. 2003) 
(“Arguments in Opposition”). 
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“difficulties are ‘rights’ never to be questioned.”345 It further 
stressed that the law would force foster parents and group home 
staff “to aid and abet dangerous, illegal homosexual and bisexual 
conduct with any foster youth who is sexually confused.”346 Fi-
nally, the Committee claimed that the law would “guarantee” 
that the futures of LGBTQ youth would be “abnormal, un-
healthy, and probably short.”347 These statements illustrate how 
the Committee’s religious liberty arguments embodied anxieties 
about sexual deviance, and sought to control the sexual orienta-
tions and gender identities of youth. 
Second, the Concerned Women for America—the nation’s 
largest conservative Christian women’s political action 
group348—also raised religious objections.349 The organization 
specifically argued that the California law would force foster par-
ents to support sexual behaviors and expressions among foster 
children that were contrary to those parents’ sincerely held reli-
gious beliefs.350 Although not explicitly framed in terms of devi-
ance, the organization’s critique shows how religious exemptions 
implicate the composition of the public child welfare system in 
ways that affect LGBTQ youth’s access to supportive living en-
vironments. 
Mississippi’s H.B. 1523 is a more recent example in the post-
Obergefell era that offers insight into the connections between 
sexual deviance concepts, religious exemptions, and the social 
control of LGBTQ youth in the child welfare system.351 To fully 
grasp these insights, consider the terrain of child welfare in Mis-
sissippi. In 2013, the Mississippi Division of Family and Chil-
dren’s Services adopted a statewide policy that grants youth the 
right to fair treatment in foster care on the basis of their sexual 
orientation or gender identity.352 At the same time, a recent 
 
 345. Id. 
 346. Id. 
 347. Id. 
 348. Jill A. Irvine, Exporting the Culture Wars: Concerned Women for Amer-
ica in the Global Arena, in WOMEN OF THE RIGHT: COMPARISONS AND INTER-
PLAY ACROSS BORDERS 36, 36 (Kathleen M. Blee & Sandra McGee Deutsch eds., 
2012). 
 349. Foster Care Anti-Discrimination Act: Hearing on A.B. 458, supra note 
344. 
 350. Id. 
 351. H.B. 1523, 2016 Reg. Sess. § 3(2)–(4), MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 11–62–3 to –
7 (2017). 
 352. MISS. DIV. OF FAMILY & CHILDREN’S SERVS., FOSTER CARE POLICY 
app.L § 6, at 195, app.M § 17, at 198 (2013), http://www.sos.ms.gov/acproposed/ 
00019917b.pdf. 
  
2398 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:2343 
 
study of state child welfare systems ranked Mississippi last in 
terms of overall child well-being.353 
With a shortage of foster families, the state of Mississippi 
has turned to private faith-based organizations to help recruit 
new foster parents.354 Importantly, the state’s largest collabora-
tor has denounced same-sex relationships and stated publicly 
that its religious views reject placing children with same-sex 
parents.355 Thus, in spite of its LGBTQ-protective child welfare 
antidiscrimination policy, Mississippi is increasingly relying on 
private faith-based organizations that denounce LGBTQ people 
in order to provide child welfare services throughout the state. 
Mississippi, however, is not alone. Increasingly, states are 
choosing to contract out public foster care and adoption services 
to private faith-based organizations.356 For instance, in a current 
federal case in Michigan, two same-sex couples who sought to 
adopt were turned away on religious grounds by a taxpayer-
funded private faith-based child placing agency,357 in spite of the 
 
 353. ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., 2017 KIDS COUNT DATA BOOK: STATE TRENDS 
IN CHILD WELL-BEING 21 (2017), http://www.aecf.org/m/resourcedoc/aecf 
-2017kidscountdatabook.pdf. 
 354. In 2016, the State of Mississippi coordinated with 200 Million Flowers, 
a Christian-affiliated, private, non-profit organization that promotes adoption, 
foster care, and social services, and other churches throughout the state to begin 
an initiative called Rescue 100. See Craig Robertson, 200 Million Flowers, ROB-
ERTSON EASTERLING (July 11, 2011), http://www.robertson.ms/mississippi 
-family-law/200-million-flowers. Through the initiative, the religious organiza-
tion recruits prospective foster parents in local communities, and the state 
works with those parents to significantly expedite the process to become foster 
parents. Wesley Muller, Want to Be a Foster Parent? How to Get Trained Quickly 
on Coast, SUNHERALD (Apr. 14, 2017), http://www.sunherald.com/news/local/ 
article144718274.html. 
 355. The founder of 200 Million Flowers, Craig Robertson, has publicly 
stated, “We are a Christian organization, and I think that the Bible is very clear 
as it talks about the morality associated with same-sex relationships.” Hadas 
Brown, Same-Sex Couples Fight Mississippi Adoption Ban, 16 WAPT NEWS 
(Aug. 13, 2015), http://www.wapt.com/article/same-sex-couples-fight 
-mississippi-adoption-ban/2094903. 
 356. MADELYN FREUNDLICH & CHARLOTTE MCCULLOUGH, STATE POL-
ICY ADVOCACY & REFORM CTR., PRIVATIZATION OF CHILD WELFARE SERVICES: 
A GUIDE FOR STATE ADVOCATES 2 (2012), http://www.washingtongrp.com/wp 
-content/uploads/2013/04/Privatization-2012-Guide.pdf; Sacha M. Coupet, The 
Subtlety of State Action in Privatized Child Welfare Services, 11 CHAP. L. REV. 
85, 85–86 (2007) (“[P]ublic-private partnerships have a long history in child wel-
fare practice . . . .”). 
 357. Dumont v. Lyon, 341 F. Supp. 3d. 706, 713 (E.D. Mich. 2018). The plain-
tiffs specifically challenge Michigan’s practice of permitting state-contracted 
and taxpayer-funded child placing agencies to use religious criteria that exclude 
same-sex couples as well as individuals based on same-sex status. Id. 
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fact that the Michigan Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices has a statewide nondiscrimination policy that prohibits dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender iden-
tity.358 The litigation revealed that Catholic agencies handle 
approximately twenty percent of foster care and adoption cases 
in Michigan.359 
At the same time, LGBTQ adults are a major subgroup of 
prospective foster and adoptive parents.360 According to recent 
data, 114,000 same-sex couples are currently raising children in 
the United States, and many of those couples became parents 
through adoption or foster care.361 In addition, same-sex couples 
are significantly more likely than different-sex couples to be rais-
ing children through adoption or foster care.362 When recruited 
and welcomed, LGBTQ adults can comprise a sizable segment of 
a state’s available pool of prospective foster or adoptive parents. 
For instance, one report estimated that in Massachusetts be-
tween fifteen and twenty-eight percent of adoptions of foster chil-
dren in the past ten years have involved same-sex parents.363 
Broad religious exemption laws like Mississippi’s H.B. 1523 
intervene against this backdrop. Now in effect, H.B. 1523 grants 
protection to three religious views involving marriage, sex, and 
gender: (1) that marriage “is or should be recognized as the union 
 
 358. Nondiscrimination Statement, MICH. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, 
https://www.michigan.gov/mdhhs/0,5885,7-339-73970_7701_76675-77286--,00 
.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2019). The state legislature had also recently en-
acted a broad religious exemption law that prohibits the state from taking ac-
tion against any child placing agency that declines to provide services if doing 
so would conflict with its religious beliefs. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 710.23(g) 
(2018). 
 359. Dumont, 341 F. Supp. 3d at 716. 
 360. See BEWKES ET AL., supra note 26, at 2 (“LGBTQ people represent an 
important subgroup of potential parents.”); see also Cynthia Godsoe, Adopting 
the Gay Family, 90 TUL. L. REV. 311, 314–15 (2015) (discussing the “neglected 
trajectory of LGB foster and adoptive parenting”). 
 361. Shoshana K. Goldberg & Keith J. Conron, How Many Same-Sex Couples 
in the U.S. Are Raising Children, UCLA SCH. L.: WILLIAMS INST. 1 (July 
2018), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Parenting 
-Among-Same-Sex-Couples.pdf. 
 362. Id. at 1 (reporting that just over one in five same-sex couples (21.4%) 
are raising adopted children compared to just 3% of different-sex couples, and 
2.9% of same-sex couples are fostering children compared to 0.4% of different-
sex couples). 
 363. Brief of Massachusetts et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendants at 
11, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, No. 18-2574 (3d Cir. Oct. 4, 2018), 2018 WL 
4862577, https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/fulton-v-city-philadelphia-states 
-amicus-brief (reporting data from the Massachusetts Adoption Resource Ex-
change). 
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of one man and one woman;” (2) that “[s]exual relations are 
properly reserved to such marriage;” and (3) that “[m]ale (man) 
or female (woman) refer to an individual’s immutable biological 
sex as objectively determined by anatomy and genetics at the 
time of birth.”364 In challenging the constitutionality of H.B. 
1523, advocates argued that elevating these beliefs for special 
protection under state law demeaned and targeted LGBTQ peo-
ple.365 In a recent decision, the Fifth Circuit held that the 
LGBTQ plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge H.B. 
1523.366 The district court below and one appellate court judge, 
however, concluded that the law created stigmatic harm on the 
LGBTQ plaintiffs by making them feel marginalized and ex-
cluded in their own communities.367 
Other provisions in H.B. 1523 include religious exemptions 
that specifically apply to child welfare.368 To begin, the exemp-
tions forbid the state from taking any discriminatory action 
against a religious organization that provides or refuses to offer 
services in foster care or adoption in a matter consistent with the 
three religious views mentioned above.369 As a result, religiously 
affiliated child welfare providers could refuse to work with 
LGBTQ youth, including those who have been kicked out of their 
families for being LGBTQ.370 Some providers may outright reject 
LGBTQ youth from receiving support, leaving those youth with 
little choice but to live on their own in homelessness.371 Other 
providers might force LGBTQ youth to stay closeted in order to 
receive support, and place them with parents who hold hostile 
attitudes toward LGBTQ people.372 
 
 364. H.B. 1523, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2(a)–(c) (Miss. 2016). 
 365. See, e.g., Brief of Scholars Who Study the LGBT Population as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Appellees at 2–3, Barber v. Bryant, 860 F.3d 345 (5th Cir. 
2017) (Nos. 16-60477, 16-60478). 
 366. Barber, 860 F.3d at 358. 
 367. Barber v. Bryant, 872 F.3d 671 (5th Cir. 2017) (Dennis, J., dissenting 
from denial to rehear the case en banc); Barber v. Bryant, 193 F. Supp. 3d 677, 
700 (S.D. Miss. 2016). In the pending federal district court case from Michigan, 
the court recognized these harms in order to conclude that prospective same-
sex adoptive parents who were rejected by faith-based child placement agencies 
had standing to bring forth their constitutional claims. Dumont v. Lyon, 341 F. 
Supp. 3d 706, 720–26 (E.D. Mich. 2018). 
 368. Miss. H.B. 1523 § 3(2). 
 369. Id.  
 370. MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., supra note 8, at 5–6 
(stressing that under religious exemptions, child welfare agencies could refuse 
to assist a LGBTQ or transgender child). 
 371. See infra Part III.B. 
 372. MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., supra note 8, at 5–6. 
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The broad exemptions in H.B. 1523 further prohibit the 
state from taking adverse action against foster or adoptive par-
ents who “guide[] , instruct[] , or raise[]” a child consistent with 
any of the three views.373 This exemption justifies keeping 
LGBTQ youth in foster homes that denounce their sexual orien-
tations or gender identities. Finally, the exemptions prohibit the 
state from taking adverse action against any person who de-
clines to participate in the provision of medical treatments, coun-
seling, and surgery related to the gender affirmation process.374 
This increases possibilities to deny transgender and gender non-
conforming youth in the child welfare system necessary transi-
tion-related medical services.   
 H.B. 1523 further enables faith-based organizations to re-
ject LGBTQ adults from parenting through foster care and adop-
tion.375 These exclusions embrace the idea that LGBTQ adults 
are unfit parents—a view that is rooted in the third major theme 
of deviance that demonizes LGBTQ adults as threats to chil-
dren.376 Of course, these restrictions have important conse-
quences for the parenting rights of LGBTQ adults.377 However, 
they also limit the ability of LGBTQ youth who need help from 
the state to access living environments that are supportive of 
their sexual orientations and gender identities.378 Therefore, 
sexual deviance concepts are a double-edged sword in the context 
of religious exemptions involving LGBTQ child welfare: they 
work to exclude LGBTQ adults from parenting through foster 
care and adoption, which in turn, increases opportunities to sub-
ordinate LGBTQ youth in the child welfare system and control 
their sexual orientation and gender identity development and 
expression in demeaning and stigmatizing ways. 
In more extreme cases, broad religious exemptions like 
those in H.B. 1523 permit foster parents to pressure LGBTQ 
 
 373. Miss. H.B. 1523 § 3(3). 
 374. Id. at § 4; cf. Maureen Carroll, Transgender Youth, Adolescent Deci-
sionmaking, and Roper v. Simmons, 56 UCLA L. REV. 725, 732–41 (2019) 
(providing a discussion of the importance of decision-making autonomy for 
transgender youth in the medical domain). 
 375. Miss. H.B. 1523 § 3(2). 
 376. See supra Part I.C (discussing sexual predator stereotypes). 
 377. LGBT advocates stressed this point in legal challenges to H.B. 1523. 
E.g., Brief of GLBTQ Advocates & Defenders (GLAD) and National Center for 
Lesbian Rights as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 10, Barber v. Bry-
ant, 138 S. Ct. 652 (2018) (mem.) (No. 17-547), 2017 WL 5433195, at *10 (noting 
that “HB 1523 thus severely inhibits LGBT persons and couples’ abilities to 
start families”). 
 378. See infra Part III.B. 
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youth to undergo damaging conversion therapies that try to 
change a person’s sexual orientation or gender identity.379 Pres-
suring LGBTQ youth to undergo these psychiatric interventions 
relates to the major theme of sexual deviance involving the as-
sumed malleability of sexual orientation and gender identity de-
velopment during adolescence and childhood.380 When criminal 
sodomy and sexual psychopath laws were in force decades ago, 
the criminal law was the main social control that enabled public 
and private actors to subject youth to these harmful medical in-
terventions.381 Child welfare law replaces this social control 
function of the criminal law when religious exemptions permit 
child welfare actors to subject LGBTQ youth to the same harm-
ful interventions. 
B. RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS AND THE ENTRENCHMENT OF 
LGBTQ-BASED CHILD WELFARE INEQUALITY 
As this Section explains, the harms of allowing antiquated 
theories of sexual deviance to thrive through broad religious ex-
emptions in the child welfare system are especially salient given 
that LGBTQ youth are already marginalized in the child welfare 
system. These youth face common challenges—many of which 
are rooted in discrimination against their sexual orientations 
and gender identities. For these reasons, it necessary to under-
stand the harms of broad religious exemptions involving LGBTQ 
child welfare in terms of how they intervene against the back-
drop of a public welfare system that is already an uneven playing 
field for LGBTQ youth. 
Currently, over 400,000 youth under the age of 18 live in 
foster homes, and many more come into contact with the child 
welfare system each year.382 It is impossible to determine exactly 
how many of these youth identify as LGBTQ because child wel-
fare providers are not legally required to track demographic in-
formation related to sexual orientation or gender identity.383 The 
 
 379. MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., supra note 8, at 2.  
 380. See supra Part I.B. As noted previously, scholars have described how 
conversion therapy practices have deep religious roots. George, supra note 14. 
 381. See supra Part II.A. 
 382. CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, FOSTER CARE STATISTICS 2016, at 3 
(2018), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/foster.pdf. 
 383. HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, LGBTQ YOUTH IN THE FOSTER CARE SYS-
TEM 2 (2015), https://assets2.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/HRC 
-YouthFosterCare-IssueBrief-FINAL.pdf1514148967. In December 2016, the 
Federal Administration on Children, Youth and Families (ACYF)  finalized 
changes to the Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System 
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limited available statistics, however, suggest that LGBTQ 
youth, and especially LGBTQ youth of color, are overrepresented 
in the child welfare system.384 These trends are troubling given 
that LGBTQ individuals are now “coming out” (or disclosing 
their sexual orientations or gender identities to others) in 
greater numbers and at earlier ages than in prior decades.385 
Critically, many LGBTQ youth come out during childhood and 
adolescence, which are life periods when they may enter the 
child welfare system.386 
Two recent studies offer a better snapshot of the problem. 
The first study, based on a nationally representative sample 
from the National Survey of Child Adolescent Well-Being–II, es-
timated that about 22.8% of youth who live in out-of-home child 
welfare placements nationwide identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
 
(AFCARS)—a federally mandated data collection program—that would have re-
quired state and tribal welfare agencies to collect data on the sexual orientation 
of youth in foster care. U.S. ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, TALKING 
POINTS: THE ADOPTION AND FOSTER CARE ANALYSIS AND REPORTING SYSTEM 
(AFCARS) FINAL RULE 2 (2017), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/ 
afcars_talking_points.pdf. With new leadership under the Trump administra-
tion, however, the ACYF reversed course and announced that it planned to de-
lay the changes until 2020 and reconsider new rules. John Kelly, Trump Ad-
ministration Delays New Child Welfare Data Rules Until 2020, but Plans 
Changes to Obama Plan, CHRON. SOC. CHANGE (Sept. 6, 2018), https:// 
chronicleofsocialchange.org/youth-services-insider/trump-administration 
-delays-new-child-welfare-data-until-2020-but-plans-changes-to-rules-set-by 
-obama; see also Bianca Wilson, Why We Need to Collect Data on LGBTQ Youth 
in Foster Care, CHRON. SOC. CHANGE (July 16, 2018), https://chronicleofsocial 
change.org/featured/need-collect-data-lgbtq-youth-foster-care (discussing the 
need for child welfare agencies to collect data on LGBTQ youth in foster care). 
 384. MARTIN ET AL., supra note 26; WILSON ET AL., supra note 26, at 6. 
 385. Gary J. Gates, Marriage and Family: LGBT Individuals and Same-Sex 
Couples, 25 FUTURE CHILD. 67, 67 (2015) (“Reduced social stigma means that 
more LGBT people are coming out earlier in life.”); Christian Grov et al., Birth 
Cohort Differences in Sexual Identity Development Milestones Among HIV-Neg-
ative Gay and Bisexual Men in the United States, 55 J. SEX RES. 984, 984 (2018) 
(reporting findings of a study in which the average age gay and bisexual men 
reported first feeling attracted to someone of the same sex was between eleven 
and twelve years old); Gary W. Harper et al., The Internet’s Multiple Roles in 
Facilitating the Sexual Orientation Identity Development of Gay and Bisexual 
Male Adolescents, 10 AM. J. MEN’S HEALTH 359, 360–61 (2016) (discussing sex-
ual orientation identity development among adolescents); Kristina R. Olson & 
Selin Gülgöz, Early Findings from the TransYouth Project: Gender Development 
in Transgender Children, 12 CHILD DEV. PERSP. 93, 93 (2018) (describing the 
initial findings of “the first large, longitudinal study of socially transitioned 
transgender children”). 
 386. See sources cited supra note 385. Many LGBTQ youth already identify 
as LGBTQ before entering foster care whereas others begin to identify as 
LGBTQ after being placed in out-of-home care. WILBER ET AL., supra note 272, 
at 36–37. 
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or questioning.387 Approximately fifty-seven percent of those sex-
ual minority youth also identify as youth or children of color.388 
The second study, the Los Angeles Foster Youth Study, fo-
cused on all LGBTQ youth between twelve- and twenty-one-
years-old in the Los Angeles County foster care system.389 Nota-
bly, the L.A. County child welfare system is the largest in the 
country.390 The study found that nineteen percent of foster youth 
in L.A. County identified as LGBTQ—almost double the esti-
mated percentage of LGBTQ youth in L.A. County.391 Approxi-
mately eighty-six percent of the LGBTQ youth in the study also 
identified as Latino, Black, or Asian Pacific Islander.392  
Many LGBTQ youth enter the child welfare system for the 
same reasons that non-LGBTQ youth do.393 Examples include 
parental drug or alcohol dependency, neglect, or maltreatment 
and abuse.394 LGBTQ youth, however, are more vulnerable to 
entering the child welfare system after facing family rejection or 
being kicked out of their homes for being LGBTQ.395 In light of 
these risks, the need for safe and supportive environments for 
LGBTQ youth is especially great. 
Nonetheless, LGBTQ youth experience several challenges 
inside the child welfare system that contribute to their further 
victimization and lack of stability within the system. At the high-
est level, child welfare administrators and frontline caseworkers 
 
 387. MARTIN ET AL., supra note 26, at 8. The study did not include 
transgender or gender nonconforming youth. Id. 
 388. Id. 
 389. WILSON ET AL., supra note 26, at 20. 
 390. CAL. DEP’T OF SOC. SERVS., CALIFORNIA - CHILD AND FAMILY SERVICES 
REVIEW: COUNTY SELF-ASSESSMENT 2011–2015 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 3 
(2016), http://www.childsworld.ca.gov/res/SIPs/2016/LosAngelesCSA.pdf. 
 391. WILSON ET AL., supra note 26, at 6. 
 392. Id. at 8. 
 393. HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, supra note 383, at 1. 
 394. Id. 
 395. See ANDREW CRAY ET AL., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, SEEKING SHELTER: 
THE EXPERIENCES AND UNMET NEEDS OF LGBT HOMELESS YOUTH 11–12 
(2013), https://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/ 
LGBTHomelessYouth.pdf; CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AM. & LAMBDA LEGAL, 
GETTING DOWN TO BASICS: TOOLS TO SUPPORT LGBTQ YOUTH IN CARE 46 
(2015), http://www.lambdalegal.org/sites/default/files/getting_down_to_basics_ 
-_2015.pdf; WILSON ET AL., supra note 26, at 34 (“[N]early 3% of the overall fos-
ter care youth population are estimated to have been kicked out or run away 
from their homes for issues related to sexuality, gender identity and gender ex-
pression . . . .”); see also Martha Albertson Fineman, Vulnerability, Resilience, 
and LGBT Youth, 23 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 307, 322 (2014) (stressing that 
“[f ]amily conflict over a youth’s sexual orientation and gender identity is a sig-
nificant element that leads to . . . the need to enter the child welfare system”). 
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often lack training and cultural competency to handle the chal-
lenges that LGBTQ youth face before and after entering the sys-
tem.396 Currently, there is a dearth of child welfare laws or poli-
cies that require such training.397 Lack of cultural competency, 
as well as implicit and explicit biases of administrators and 
frontline caseworkers, can negatively affect placements and con-
tribute to LGBTQ youth being housed in living environments 
where they face discrimination or mistreatment on the basis of 
their sexual orientations or gender identities.398 
Moreover, in spite of being overrepresented in the child wel-
fare system, LGBTQ youth are harder to place in foster homes 
and adoptive families compared to non-LGBTQ youth.399 This is 
especially the case for LGBTQ adolescents given that it is overall 
easier to place children and infants through foster care or adop-
tion.400 Many LGBTQ youth never find suitable foster or adop-
tive homes before they emancipate (or “age out”) from the child 
welfare system upon reaching adulthood.401 In addition, many 
prospective parents decide not to foster or adopt LGBTQ youth 
or children because of their own anti-LGBTQ biases or because 
they feel unequipped to do so.402 For these reasons, LGBTQ 
youth are more likely to bounce between multiple foster homes 
and are often considered “unadoptable.”403 They are also more 
likely, simply on the basis of their sexual orientations or gender 
identities, to be funneled into group homes and other restrictive 
 
 396. Gallegos et al., supra note 27, at 227–28. 
 397. Currently, only nine states require LGBTQ-inclusive competency train-
ing for child welfare staff or foster parents. Foster and Adoption Laws, MOVE-
MENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, http://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/foster_ 
and_adoption_laws (last visited Mar. 19, 2019). 
 398. WILSON ET AL., supra note 26, at 11; Gallegos et al., supra note 27. 
 399. AMY DWORSKY, MATHEMATICA POLICY RESEARCH, THE ECONOMIC 
WELL-BEING OF LESBIAN, GAY, AND BISEXUAL YOUTH TRANSITIONING OUT OF 
FOSTER CARE 2 (2013), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/opre/opre_ 
lgbt_brief_01_04_2013.pdf (stressing that “studies do suggest that placement 
instability is common for LGB youth”); WILSON ET AL., supra note 26, at 6. 
 400. Betty Boyle-Duke, Black Adolescent Girls in Foster Care, in BLACK 
GIRLS AND ADOLESCENTS: FACING THE CHALLENGES 183, 193 (Catherine Fisher 
Collins ed., 2015) (“In general, teens in care are less likely to reach permanency 
goals of reuniting with birth parents as compared to younger children.”). 
 401. Ernst Hunter, What’s Good for the Gays Is Good for the Gander: Making 
Homeless Youth Housing Safer for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender 
Youth, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 543, 545 (2008). 
 402. HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, supra note 383, at 2–3.  
 403. WILSON ET AL., supra note 26, at 6, 11; Gallegos et al., supra note 27. 
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forms of congregate care that are primarily intended to house 
youth with behavioral problems.404 
In both foster care and group homes, LGBTQ youth are at 
much greater risk for maltreatment and abuse (sexual, physical, 
and verbal) compared to non-LGBTQ youth.405 Child welfare ac-
tors are also more likely to discipline LGBTQ youth for age-ap-
propriate sexual conduct or gender nonconforming expressions 
that would likely go unpunished if they had involved non-
LGBTQ youth.406 These forms of rejection can have serious con-
sequences for LGBTQ youth in the child welfare system. For in-
stance, LGBTQ youth who face family rejection (whether in their 
biological families or in child welfare placements) are at greater 
risk for drug and alcohol dependency, high-risk sexual behav-
iors, depression, and suicide.407 
These various challenges contribute to LGBTQ youth leav-
ing or being kicked out of child welfare placements with no place 
to live.408 Recent studies have found that as high as twenty to 
forty percent of the homeless youth population in the United 
States identifies as LGBTQ.409 Although the exact percentage of 
homeless LGBTQ youth who had previous contact with the child 
welfare system is unknown, some studies estimate that it may 
be as high as sixty percent in certain regions.410 While homeless, 
 
 404. WILSON ET AL., supra note 26, at 6; Gallegos et al., supra note 27. 
 405. WILSON ET AL., supra note 26, at 11. 
 406. Id. at 11–12. 
 407. Caitlin Ryan et al., Family Acceptance in Adolescence and the Health of 
LBGT Young Adults, 23 J. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRIC NURSING 205, 
210 (2010).  
 408. Woods, supra note 30, 1678–83 (discussing connections between rejec-
tion in the child welfare system and homelessness for LGBTQ youth). 
 409. See, e.g., LAURA DURSO & GARY GATES, THE WILLIAMS INST., SERVING 
OUR YOUTH: FINDINGS FROM A NATIONAL SURVEY OF SERVICES PROVIDERS 
WORKING WITH LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER YOUTH WHO ARE 
HOMELESS OR AT RISK OF BECOMING HOMELESS 3 (2012), https:// 
williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Durso-Gates-LGBT 
-Homeless-Youth-Survey-July-2012.pdf (reporting that LGBTQ youth repre-
sent thirty to forty percent of the youth served in drop-in centers, street out-
reach programs, and housing programs); NICO SIFRA QUINTANA ET AL., CTR. 
FOR AM. PROGRESS, ON THE STREETS: THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO GAY AND 
TRANSGENDER HOMELESS YOUTH 6 tbl.1 (2010), https://cdn.americanprogress 
.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2010/06/pdf/lgbtyouthhomelessness.pdf (pre-
senting the results of a sample of studies among gay and homeless youth be-
tween 2000 and 2008). 
 410. AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 104B, at 4 (2007), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/policy/2007_am_ 
104b.authcheckdam.pdf. Studies that are not specific to the LGBTQ context 
have also found strong connections between youth homelessness and leaving 
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LGBTQ youth face increased risk for further physical, sexual, 
and verbal victimization.411  
With no stable means of income or housing, many homeless 
LGBTQ youth engage in sex work and other forms of criminality 
to survive.412 As a result, homelessness places LGBTQ youth at 
risk for being funneled into the juvenile and criminal justice sys-
tems,413 where LGBTQ youth (and especially LGBTQ youth of 
color) are also overrepresented.414 Illustrating the relationship 
between challenges in the child welfare system and involvement 
in the juvenile justice system, LGBTQ youth are overrepre-
sented among “dually-involved” or “crossover youth,” meaning 
youth in the juvenile justice system who have had prior involve-
ment with the child welfare system.415 Importantly, many du-
ally-involved or crossover LGBTQ youth have experienced home-
lessness after being rejected from their biological families or the 
 
child welfare placements. See, e.g., FAMILY & YOUTH SERVS. BUREAU, STREET 
OUTREACH PROGRAM: DATA COLLECTION PROJECT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 
(2014), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/fysb/fysb_sop_summary_final 
.pdf. 
 411. KATAYOON MAJD ET AL., HIDDEN INJUSTICE: LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, 
AND TRANSGENDER YOUTH IN JUVENILE COURTS 72 (2009), http://www 
.nclrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/hidden_injustice.pdf. 
 412. MEREDITH DANK ET AL., URBAN INST., SURVIVING THE STREETS OF NEW 
YORK: EXPERIENCES OF LGBTQ YOUTH, YMSM, AND YWSW ENGAGED IN SUR-
VIVAL SEX 5 (2015), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/42186/ 
2000119-Surviving-the-Streets-of-New-York.pdf (“Homelessness is one of the 
most common drivers of youth engagement in survival sex.”). It is important to 
note here that LGBTQ adults of color also face systemic discrimination—both 
on the basis of their LGBTQ identities and their races or ethnicities—in the 
criminal justice system. See generally, e.g., Russell Robinson, Masculinity as 
Prison, Sexual Identity, Race, and Incarceration, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1309 (2011). 
 413. See generally Woods, supra note 30 (discussing connections between ex-
clusions in the child welfare system and the involvement of LGBTQ youth in 
the juvenile and criminal justice systems). 
 414. MAJD ET AL., supra note 411, at 2 (highlighting an estimate that thir-
teen percent of youth in juvenile custody are LGBT); Irvine & Canfield, supra 
note 315, at 248 (estimating that twenty percent of youth in juvenile detention 
identify as LGBTQ); Shannan Wilber, Invest Upstream to Promote the Well-Be-
ing of LGBT Youth: Addressing Root Causes of Juvenile System Involvement, in 
A NEW JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: TOTAL REFORM FOR A BROKEN SYSTEM 175 
(Nancy E. Dowd ed., 2010) (noting that “the vast majority” of LGBT youth in 
the juvenile justice system are youth of color). It is difficult to estimate the exact 
percentage of LGBTQ youth in the juvenile justice system because many 
LGBTQ youth are not “out” while in detention. See, e.g., WESLEY WARE, JUVE-
NILE JUSTICE PROJECT OF LA., LOCKED UP & OUT: LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, & 
TRANSGENDER YOUTH IN LOUISIANA’S JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 18 (2010), 
https://www.familybuilders.org/sites/default/files/pdf/LockedUpandOut.pdf. 
 415. Irvine & Canfield, supra note 315, at 248. 
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child welfare system.416 Difficulties upon release from juvenile 
or criminal detention put LGBTQ youth at risk for homelessness 
again, upon which they may cycle back into the juvenile or crim-
inal justice system.417 
In short, the child welfare system is fraught with LGBTQ 
inequality. Many LGBTQ youth in the child welfare domain 
have to negotiate their LGBTQ identities as well as other aspects 
of their identities upon which they may face further marginali-
zation because of race, ethnicity, and gender inequalities.418 
Broad religious exemption laws involving LGBTQ child welfare 
intervene against the backdrop of this uneven playing field, and 
further exacerbate the problems for LGBTQ youth in the child 
welfare system.  
IV.  EQUALITY CONSIDERATIONS   
The previous Parts have demonstrated why we should un-
derstand the recent push for broad religious exemptions involv-
ing LGBTQ child welfare as the latest point on a historical tra-
jectory of child welfare interventions that rest on sexual 
deviance concepts to control and subordinate LGBTQ youth. 
This Part discusses the broader implications of this Article’s the-
oretical and historical analysis for LGBTQ equality. First, it ex-
plains why we should consider the experiences of LGBTQ youth 
in the child welfare system as an essential part of the debate 
over religious liberty and LGBTQ equality. Second, it describes 
why it is necessary to include remedying LGBTQ-based inequal-
ity in the child welfare system as part of a broader vision for a 
fully inclusive LGBTQ antidiscrimination regime.  
 
 416. Id. at 252. 
 417. See, e.g., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS & MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PRO-
JECT, UNJUST: HOW THE BROKEN JUVENILE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 
FAIL LGBTQ YOUTH 23 (2016), http://www.lgbtmap.org/file/lgbt-criminal 
-justice-youth.pdf (“Without appropriate support, many LGBTQ young people 
released from the system face substantial barriers to successful re-entry.”); 
Heather M. Berberet, Putting the Pieces Together for Queer Youth: A Model of 
Integrated Assessment of Need and Program Planning, 85 CHILD WELFARE 361, 
373 (2006) (reporting the findings of one study that found that forty-five percent 
of LGBT homeless youth reported involvement with the juvenile justice system). 
 418. See generally Michelle Page, Comment, Forgotten Youth: Homeless 
LGBT Youth of Color and the Runaway and Homeless Youth Act, 12 NW. J.L. & 
SOC. POL’Y 17 (2017) (discussing the causes and effects of homelessness on 
LGBT youth of color). Cf. Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersec-
tionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. 
REV. 1241 (1991) (developing “intersectionality” as a framework to evaluate the 
race and gender dimensions of violence against women of color). 
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The debate over religious liberty and LGBTQ equality has 
largely centered on LGBTQ adults, and in particular, same-sex 
couples who are married or wish to get married.419 Proponents 
of broad religious exemptions that include many of the objections 
in the LGBTQ context argue that baking a cake or taking photos 
for a same-sex wedding “facilitates” same-sex marriage in viola-
tion of the sincerely held religious beliefs of organizations and 
individuals.420 They argue that marriage is an exceptional act, 
and in so doing, frame religious liberty claims as responding to 
conduct (namely, same-sex marriage) rather than targeting 
LGBTQ status in violation of antidiscrimination principles.421  
Conversely, scholars arguing for limits on religious accom-
modation that would have the effect of blocking many of the ex-
emption claims in the LGBTQ context argue that these claims 
do not involve issues that are exceptional to same-sex mar-
riage.422 In rejecting the conduct and status distinctions under-
lying religious liberty claims, these scholars stress that broad 
religious exemptions undermine LGBTQ antidiscrimination pro-
tections and permit discrimination against LGBTQ individuals 
and same-sex couples in a variety of domains (for instance, em-
ployment, housing, public accommodations, education, and busi-
nesses serving the public).423 Based on these ideas, scholars who 
argue for limits on religious accommodation contend that these 
 
 419. See NeJaime, supra note 15, at 1180–95 (describing that the current 
debate over religious liberty and LGBTQ equality largely centers on marriage 
for same-sex couples); Sepper, supra note 15, at 711–12 (describing the positions 
of proponents who advocate for broad religious exemptions that include the ob-
jections to marriage equality). 
 420. See Douglas Laycock, Afterword, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELI-
GIOUS LIBERTY 195 (Douglas Laycock et al. eds., 2008); see also NeJaime & 
Siegel, supra note 15, at 2565 n.200 (discussing “marriage conscience protec-
tion”); Oleske, supra note 15, at 102; Sepper, supra note 15, at 711–12 (describ-
ing the positions of proponents who advocate for broad religious exemptions that 
include the objections to marriage equality). 
 421. See SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 15 (dis-
cussing the unique relationship between same-sex marriage and threats to re-
ligious liberty); see also NeJaime, supra note 15, at 1185–88 (discussing “mar-
riage conscience protection” proposals); Sepper, supra note 15, at 714 (noting 
that proponents who advocate for broad religious exemptions that include many 
of the objections in the LGBTQ context “adopt the position that marriage is an 
exceptional act”). 
 422. See, e.g., NeJaime, supra note 15, at 1178 (“[T]he current debate misi-
dentifies same-sex marriage as central to the conflict between sexual orienta-
tion nondiscrimination and religious freedom . . . .”). 
 423. See Courtney Joslin, Marital Status Discrimination 2.0, 95 B.U. L. REV. 
805, 807–08 (2015); NeJaime, supra note 15, at 1230; NeJaime & Siegel, supra 
note 15, at 2564; Oleske, supra note 15, at 102. 
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exemptions should be addressed under the legal framework of 
antidiscrimination law, and not through the narrow lens of mar-
riage law.424  
The theoretical and historical analysis of this Article bol-
sters these scholarly critiques. By narrowly focusing on same-
sex marriage, proponents of broad religious exemptions have 
largely overshadowed LGBTQ youth in the child welfare sys-
tem—even when those exemptions would directly affect this 
highly vulnerable population. The debates surrounding H.B. 
1523 in the Mississippi legislature illustrate this very point. 
When presenting H.B. 1523 in both the state Senate and House 
of Representatives, legislative sponsors of the bill stressed that 
the legislation responded to the legalization of same-sex mar-
riage after Obergefell.425 LGBTQ youth in the child welfare sys-
tem were never mentioned during the hours of legislative de-
bate,426 even though H.B. 1523 includes several religious 
exemptions that potentially shape their everyday living environ-
ment.427 The few references to child welfare issues centered on 
marriage—namely, protecting the ability of religiously affiliated 
organizations to refuse to place children with married same-sex 
couples through foster care or adoption.428 
Scholars who argue for limits on religious accommodation 
have engaged with fundamental questions about how we should 
conceptualize LGBTQ identity in the debate over religious lib-
erty and LGBTQ equality, including the constitutive role of con-
duct in shaping LGBTQ identity (for instance, getting married). 
In one leading view, Douglas NeJaime argues that religious ex-
emptions target the enactment of sexual orientation through 
 
 424. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 316, at 657; Chai R. Feldblum, Moral 
Conflict and Liberty: Gay Rights and Religion, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 61, 121 (2006); 
Martha Minow, Should Religious Groups Be Exempt from Civil Rights Laws?, 
48 B.C. L. REV. 781, 808–14 (2007); NeJaime, supra note 15, at 1179. 
 425. Statement of Rep. Andy Gipson, Mississippi House of Representatives, 
2016 Reg. Sess., Feb. 19, 2016, at 30:40 (noting that Obergefell triggered H.B. 
1523), http://law.mc.edu/legislature/bill_details.php?id=4621&session=2016; 
Statement of Sen. Jenifer Branning, Mississippi Senate, 2016 Reg. Sess., Mar. 
30, 2016, at 2:34–3:06 (describing H.B. 1523 and noting that the bill “was 
brought forward as a result of the U.S. Supreme Court decision Obergefell last 
summer that legalized same-sex marriage”), http://law.mc.edu/legislature/bill_ 
details.php?id=4621&session=2016. 
 426. Legislative History Project, MC L., http://law.mc.edu/legislature/bill_ 
details.php?id=4621&session=2016 (last visited Mar. 19, 2019).  
 427. H.B. 1523, 2016 Reg. Sess. § 3(2)–(4) (Miss. 2016). 
 428. See Legislative History Project, supra note 426. 
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same-sex relationships, and thus have the potential to under-
mine sexual orientation antidiscrimination protections both in-
side and outside of marriage contexts.429 Underlying NeJaime’s 
argument is a theoretical conception of sexual orientation as a 
public and conduct-based relational identity.430 NeJaime argues 
that lesbians and gay men enact their sexual orientation 
through same-sex relationships,431 and thus marriage equality 
is only one way in which lesbians and gay men achieve relation-
ship-based sexual orientation equality.432 
This theoretical conception of sexual orientation identity 
can be extended even further to illuminate the importance of 
considering child welfare issues concerning LGBTQ youth in the 
debate over religious liberty and LGBTQ equality. Specifically, 
this conception assists in mapping how religious exemptions per-
mit discrimination against LGBTQ youth in the child welfare 
system in ways that match and differ from discrimination 
against adults in same-sex relationships. As discussed below, 
this mapping provides additional support for calls in legal schol-
arship to address religious exemptions under antidiscrimination 
legal frameworks, and underscores a need to devote greater at-
tention to the specific experiences of LGBTQ youth in fleshing 
out the meaning of LGBTQ antidiscrimination principles. 
In some situations, religious exemptions involving LGBTQ 
child welfare protect instances of religiously motivated discrim-
ination against age-appropriate, relationship-based conduct 
through which LGBTQ youth enact their sexual orientations. To 
illustrate this point, consider Annette Thomas’s story.433 When 
Annette was seventeen years old and in high school, she was da-
ting another teenage girl. One day, Annette’s foster mother over-
heard a phone conversation between her and her best friend 
about a girl that Annette was dating. After the call ended, An-
nette’s foster mother pulled out the Bible, told her that she was 
going to Hell if she continued down that path, and demanded 
that she cut off all ties with her girlfriend as well as her best 
friend (who also identified as lesbian). Isolated from her friends, 
Annette became severely depressed and attempted suicide, after 
 
 429. NeJaime, supra note 15, at 1177. 
 430. Id. at 1196–97. 
 431. Id. at 1178. 
 432. Id. at 1196. 
 433. Annette Thomas’s story is featured in Fostering Gay Youth, OUTFRONT, 
(June 19, 2014), https://www.outfrontmagazine.com/news/community-voices/ 
fostering-gay-youth.  
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which she was committed to a psychiatric hospital. Her foster 
parents then sent her to a Christian counselor who specialized 
in conversion therapy. When Annette refused to reject her les-
bian identity, her foster parents kicked her out of the house. She 
was then sent to live in a group home where she was the only 
gay youth and faced harassment. 
Although not a focus in the debate over religious liberty and 
LGBTQ equality, these forms of relationship-based discrimina-
tion have special meaning for LGBTQ identity construction. Ad-
olescence is a sensitive period of sexual identity formation.434 
Many youth begin to explore their sexual identities during ado-
lescence, and often do so through dating.435 With the stigma that 
still attaches to homosexuality in certain segments of society, 
non-heterosexual youth may fear judgment, seclusion, or victim-
ization when they enact their sexual identities through da-
ting.436 This is especially the case for many non-heterosexual 
youth in the child welfare system who have already experienced 
rejection based on their sexual orientations from biological or 
foster family members, child welfare administrators or frontline 
caseworkers, or group home staff.437  
In other situations, religious exemptions protect instances 
of religiously motivated discrimination against non-relation-
ship-based conduct or expression through which LGBTQ youth 
enact their sexual orientations or gender identities. For in-
stance, foster parents or group home staff may invoke their reli-
gious views in order to pressure LGBTQ youth to express them-
selves through dress, jewelry, or hairstyles that adhere to 
traditional gender norms.438 Transgender and gender non-con-
forming youth in particular may be forced to dress and present 
their genders in ways that are inconsistent with their gender 
 
 434. See Shelley L. Craig & Ashley Austin, Childhood and Adolescence, in 
TRAUMA, RESILIENCE, AND HEALTH PROMOTION IN LGBT PATIENTS 57, 57 (Kris-
ten L. Eckstrand & Jennifer Potter eds., 2017) (“[A]dolescence is the develop-
mental stage during which sexual orientation . . . plays an increasingly im-
portant role.”). 
 435. See Samantha DeHaan et al., The Interplay Between Online and Offline 
Explorations of Identity, Relationships, and Sex: A Mixed-Methods Study with 
LGBT Youth, 50 J. SEX RES. 421, 422 (2013) (“[A]dolescence is a sensitive period 
in which many youth begin to explore their sexuality and engage in close peer 
and romantic relationships.”). 
 436. See id. 
 437. See supra Part II. 
 438. See MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., supra note 8 (stating 
the welfare system may block recognition of LGBTQ youths’ gender identities 
or sexualities). 
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identities.439 These forms of gender identity subordination can 
severely damage a transgender or gender non-conforming 
youth’s sense of self, and result in several negative outcomes in-
cluding depression and suicide.440  
Moreover, foster parents or group home staff may invoke 
their religious views to forbid LGBTQ youth from participating 
or belonging to community-based or school-based organizations 
geared to support LGBTQ youth, for instance, an LGBTQ youth 
group or a gay-straight alliance.441 Especially for LGBTQ youth 
in the child welfare system who have suffered rejection on the 
basis of their sexual orientations or gender identities, and con-
tinue to face discrimination and rejection at school,442 these or-
ganizations can offer additional networks of support, role mod-
els, resources, and safe spaces.443 Studies show that involvement 
in LGBTQ youth organizations is correlated with many immedi-
ate and long-term positive outcomes for LGBTQ youth, including 
 
 439. See id. 
 440. See Arnold H. Grossman & Anthony R. D’Augelli, Transgender Youth 
and Life-Threatening Behaviors, 37 SUICIDE & LIFE-THREATENING BEHAV. 527, 
534–35 (2007) (identifying transgender youth as at risk for suicide and finding 
a connection between suicide attempts and body esteem).  
 441. Cf. MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., supra note 8 (stating 
that agencies can choose to place LGBT youth in religious homes that are unac-
cepting and resistant to their gender and sexual identities). 
 442. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “LIKE WALKING THROUGH A 
HAILSTORM:” DISCRIMINATION AGAINST LGBT YOUTH IN US SCHOOLS (2016), 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/uslgbt1216web_2.pdf (dis-
cussing difficulties surrounding discrimination and bullying against LGBT 
youth in schools). 
 443. See CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, SUPPORTING YOUR LGBTQ 
YOUTH: A GUIDE FOR FOSTER PARENTS 9 (2013), https://www.childwelfare.gov/ 
pubPDFs/LGBTQyouth.pdf (listing gay-straight alliance groups, policies 
against bullying, and inclusive teachers and curriculum as “practices . . . [for] 
improving school climate for LGBTQ youth”); NAT’L CTR. OF CHILD WELFARE 
EXCELLENCE, REACHING HIGHER: A CURRICULUM FOR FOSTER/ADOPTIVE PAR-
ENTS AND KINSHIP CAREGIVERS CARING FOR LGBTQ YOUTH 79, http://www 
.nccwe.org/downloads/LGBTQ-FosterParentFacilitatorGuide.pdf (“LGBTQ 
youth need peers, mentors, and professionals who identify with LGBTQ issues. 
Regardless of how supportive you may be it is critical that the youth connect 
with a community of LGBTQ people, and with services/programs that can pro-
vide ongoing support.”); V. Paul Poteat et al., Gay–Straight Alliances Are Asso-
ciated with Student Health: A Multischool Comparison of LGBTQ and Hetero-
sexual Youth, 23 J. RES. ON ADOLESCENCE 319, 319–20 (2012) (discussing the 
positive effects of alliance programs in schools); Jordan Blair Woods, Gay-
Straight Alliances and Sanctioning Pretextual Discrimination Under the Equal 
Access Act, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 373, 406–11 (2010) (discussing 
empirical research on gay-straight alliances and LGBTQ student safety). 
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greater self-esteem and comfort with expressing their sexual ori-
entations or gender identities.444 
Beyond undermining LGBTQ equality inside the child wel-
fare system, these forms of religiously motivated discrimination 
also have consequences outside of the child welfare domain that 
threaten LGBTQ equality in society at large. Homelessness is 
one category of potential spillover effects. Many LGBTQ youth 
experience homelessness after running away or being kicked out 
of child welfare placements that reject or mistreat them on the 
basis of their sexual orientations or gender identities.445 In pro-
tecting religiously motivated discrimination against LGBTQ 
youth, broad religious exemptions encourage child welfare envi-
ronments that are hostile toward LGBTQ youth and diminish 
the availability of placements that are supportive of their sexual 
orientations and gender identities.446   
With regard to LGBTQ identity construction, homelessness 
can negatively shape the subjectivities of LGBTQ youth. Studies 
show that many homeless youth internalize the idea that they 
are to blame for their difficult living situations, which in turn, 
damages their self-esteem and sense of self-worth.447 If broad re-
ligious exemptions protect instances of religiously motivated 
 
 444. See, e.g., Salvatore Ioverno et al., The Protective Role of Gay–Straight 
Alliances for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Questioning Students: A Prospective 
Analysis, 3 PSYCHOL. SEXUAL ORIENTATION & GENDER DIVERSITY 397, 397–406 
(2016) (listing positive outcomes associated with gay-straight alliances in 
schools); Russell B. Toomey et al., High School Gay–Straight Alliances (GSAs) 
and Young Adult Well-Being: An Examination of GSA Presence, Participation, 
and Perceived Effectiveness, 15 APPLIED DEV. SCI. 175, 175–85 (2011) (finding 
positive outcomes for LGBTQ students at schools with gay-straight alliances). 
 445. See Alex S. Keuroghlian et al., Out on the Street: A Public Health and 
Policy Agenda for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Youth Who Are 
Homeless, 84 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 66, 67 (2014) (“The most commonly cited 
reason among LGBT youth for becoming homeless is running away from fami-
lies who reject them because of sexual orientation or gender identity[, and] . . . 
[t]he second most commonly cited reason is being forced out.”). 
 446. See BEWKES ET AL., supra note 26, at 7–8 (discussing discriminatory 
“laws and policies that . . . allow child welfare providers to opt out of . . . provid-
ing affirming care to LGBTQ youth”); cf. Polikoff, Resisting “Don’t Ask, Don’t 
Tell,” supra note 170 (“The most obvious connection between lesbian and gay 
youth and foster parents is the importance of the availability of gay and lesbian 
foster parents to provide homes for gay teenagers who need acceptance and sup-
port for their journey into adulthood.”). 
 447. Cf. David Farrugia, The Symbolic Burden of Homelessness: Towards a 
Theory of Youth Homelessness as Embodied Subjectivity, 47 J. SOC. 71, 84–85 
(2010) (finding “homelessness carries a symbolic burden” for youth); Sue-Ann 
MacDonald, The Paradox of Being Young and Homeless: Resiliency in the Face 
of Constraints, 4 INT’L J. CHILD YOUTH & FAM. STUD. 425, 436 (2013) (explain-
ing the self-perceived stigmatizing labels homeless youth feel). 
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anti-LGBTQ discrimination in the child welfare system that con-
tribute to the homelessness of LGBTQ youth, then those youth 
may internalize the stigmatizing idea that their LGBTQ identi-
ties are to blame for their homelessness.448 
Homelessness can also result in problems that inhibit 
LGBTQ youth from achieving positive outcomes later in life.449 
These problems include financial instability, food insecurity, un-
employment, lack of education, and poor health.450 While home-
less, LGBTQ youth are at greater risk for experiencing further 
sexual, physical, and verbal victimization.451 Participation in 
survival crimes (for instance, theft or sex work) also increases 
possibilities for homeless LGBTQ youth to be funneled into the 
juvenile or criminal justice systems,452 and furthers marginali-
zation on the basis of their sexual orientations or gender identi-
ties.453 This is especially the case for LGBTQ youth of color, who 
face the additional burden of being marginalized on the basis of 
their races and ethnicities in these systems.454 Difficulties upon 
release from juvenile or criminal detention put LGBTQ youth at 
risk for homelessness again, upon which they may cycle back 
into the juvenile or criminal justice system.455 
Another category of potential spillover effects involves 
emancipation (or “aging out”) from the child welfare system.456 
 
 448. See Nicholas Newton, Gay Youths at Risk: Homelessness, Hustling, and 
Gay Youth Shelters, in LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER AMERI-
CANS AT RISK: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS 75, 81 (Chuck Stewart ed., 2018) (dis-
cussing how homeless LGBTQ youth often internalize the idea that their sexual 
orientations and gender identities are to blame for their living situations). 
 449. See COALITION FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, YOUTH HOMELESSNESS AND JU-
VENILE JUSTICE: OPPORTUNITIES FOR COLLABORATION AND IMPACT 1 (2016), 
http://juvjustice.org/sites/default/files/resource-files/policy%20brief_FINAL 
.compressed.pdf (“[Homelessness can] have long term impacts and can hurt 
young peoples’ chances for educational attainment, good health, and economic 
stability later in life.”). 
 450. See id. at 1–2. 
 451. See MAJD ET AL., supra note 411 (finding homeless LGBTQ youth are 
at “high risk of victimization, including assault, robbery and rape”). 
 452. See DANK ET AL., supra note 412, at 74, 79 (discussing the “perceived 
risks of involvement in the sex trade, including incarceration,” and finding 
“many youth engaged in survival sex experience frequent arrest”).  
 453. See generally CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS & MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT 
PROJECT, supra note 417 (discussing LGBT inequality in the juvenile justice 
system); MAJD ET AL., supra note 411 (same). 
 454. See CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS & MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, su-
pra note 417, at 4 (“[B]lack [LGBTQ] youth . . . are disproportionately more 
likely to be in the juvenile justice system . . . .”). 
 455. See supra note 417 and accompanying text. 
 456. See Curry & Abrams, supra note 38, at 143 (“Youth who exit the foster 
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Given that it is impossible for many LGBTQ youth to reunite 
with their biological families, numerous LGBTQ youth remain 
in foster care until they reach adulthood.457 A robust body of re-
search documents the difficulties of youth in achieving self-suf-
ficiency after aging out of the child welfare system. For instance, 
LGBTQ youth struggle with unemployment, poor health out-
comes, and homelessness.458 Critically, difficulties in the child 
welfare system, such as placement instability, are precursors to 
difficulties in achieving livelihood and independence after aging 
out of the system.459 Therefore, challenges surrounding sexual 
orientation in the child welfare system are connected to the sta-
bility and well-being of LGBTQ youth after they age out of the 
system.  
To date, there is a dearth of research on the specific obsta-
cles of LGBTQ youth who are emancipated from the child wel-
fare system.460 The limited knowledge that exists, however, sug-
gests that aging out of foster care is a major factor that 
contributes to LGBTQ homelessness for young adults.461 In ad-
dition, LGBTQ youth—and especially LGBTQ youth of color—
 
care system without having achieved a permanent placement are typically re-
ferred to as ‘emancipated foster youth’ or ‘aged-out youth.’”). 
 457. See DWORSKY, supra note 399, at 1 (stating that LGB youth in foster 
care are not likely to “be reunified with their families or placed in adoptive 
homes”). 
 458. See Stephanie Cosner Berzin et al., Emerging Versus Emancipating: 
The Transition to Adulthood for Youth in Foster Care, 29 J. ADOLESCENT RES. 
616, 618–19 (2014) (discussing the “poor outcomes” for youth aging out of the 
foster care system, including “homelessness, unemployment, unplanned preg-
nancy, low educational attainment, legal system involvement, and substance 
abuse” related to difficulties with self-sufficiency); Curry & Abrams, supra note 
38, at 144–45 (examining studies which find aged-out, or emancipated, youth 
struggle to be financially independent and find stable housing at a higher rate 
than typical lower incomes youth). See generally MARK E. COURTNEY ET AL., 
MIDWEST EVALUATION OF THE ADULT FUNCTIONING OF FORMER FOSTER 
YOUTH: OUTCOMES AT AGE 26 (2011), https://www.chapinhall 
.org/sites/wp-content/uploads/Midwest-Eval-Outcomes-at-Age-26.pdf (studying 
the outcomes of youth formally in the foster care system). 
 459. See Curry & Abrams, supra note 38, at 144 (“[F]oster youth who never 
achieve permanency often face additional difficulties, particularly during the 
transition to adulthood.”). 
 460. See, e.g., Svetlana Shpiegel & Cassandra Simmel, Functional Outcomes 
Among Sexual Minority Youth Emancipating from the Child Welfare System, 61 
CHILD. & YOUTH SERVICES REV. 101, 101 (2016) (noting that previous studies 
have failed to look at “sub-groups of foster care alumni” that may be “more dis-
advantaged than others,” particularly sexual minorities). 
 461. See, e.g., DURSO & GATES, supra note 409, at 4 (finding aging out of fos-
ter care is one of the “[t]op five reasons why LGBT youth are homeless or at-
risk of becoming homeless”); Keuroghlian et al., supra note 445 (listing aging 
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fare worse than non-LGBTQ youth during the transition period 
to adulthood after emancipating from the child welfare sys-
tem.462 In permitting religiously motivated discrimination 
against LGBTQ youth, broad religious exemptions can exacer-
bate these problems.  
For instance, one recent study from the federally mandated 
Multi-Site Evaluation of Foster Youth Programs compared data 
on the outcomes of nineteen-year-old sexual minority youth with 
heterosexual youth who had recently transitioned out of foster 
care.463 The study found that the sexual minority youth, most of 
whom also identified as African American or Hispanic,464 fared 
worse than the heterosexual youth across four key outcomes: ed-
ucational attainment, employment, economic wellbeing, and 
homelessness.465 Specifically, sexual minority youth were less 
likely to obtain a high school diploma or GED, have employment 
experience between the ages of seventeen and nineteen, achieve 
financial stability, or have a checking account, a savings account, 
or a vehicle.466 The sexual minority youth were also more likely 
to experience homelessness and to receive financial assis-
tance.467 After controlling for other relevant variables, the study 
also found that sexual orientation was associated with each cat-
egory of outcomes.468 Based on these results, the researchers at-
tributed greater negative outcomes for sexual minority youth to 
challenges associated with sexual orientation in child welfare 
placements.469  
Accordingly, broad religious exemptions involving LGBTQ 
child welfare afford protection to instances of religiously moti-
vated discrimination that stigmatize LGBTQ youth based on 
their sexual orientations and gender identities, and jeopardize 
 
out as a common reason LGBT youth become homeless). 
 462. See, e.g., Shpiegel & Simmel, supra note 460, at 106–07 (finding eman-
cipated sexual minorities fared worse than their heterosexual peers and a “pos-
sibil[ity] that the combined circumstances of being [a] racial/ethnic minority, as 
well as [a] sexual minority, negatively affected youths’ functioning” leading to 
“substantial challenges”). 
 463. See id. at 103. “[The] Multi-Site Evaluation of Foster Youth Programs 
(MEFYP)[ ]  [is] a randomized-controlled study designed to access the effective-
ness of four independent living programs in California and Massachusetts.” Id. 
 464. Id. 
 465. Id. at 104–06. 
 466. See id. at 105 tbl.2. 
 467. Id. 
 468. See id. at 106 (“[O]ur . . . findings indicate that the deficits for sexual 
minority youth are noteworthy across all categories of functional outcomes.”). 
 469. Id. 
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their stability in the system.470 In addition, these instances of 
discrimination have potential long-term consequences that 
reach beyond the child welfare system to jeopardize LGBTQ 
equality in society at large.471 For these reasons, broad religious 
exemptions involving LGBTQ child welfare do much more work 
than simply mediate conflicts between religious liberty and mar-
riage equality. Rather, these religious exemptions have a larger 
role in facilitating and perpetuating structural and cultural 
LGBTQ-based inequality both inside and outside of the child 
welfare system. 
In her work, Professor Dorothy Roberts urges us to approach 
inequality in the child welfare system as a civil rights issue.472 
Focusing on race, Roberts explains that racial inequality in child 
welfare ultimately stems from broader systemic racial injus-
tices.473 In conceptualizing racial inequality in the child welfare 
system as a group and race-based civil rights violation, she ar-
gues that efforts to eliminate this inequality must extend beyond 
individual child welfare grievances to broader societal action.474  
These insights apply to the LGBTQ child welfare context as 
well. The analysis above illustrates that the subordination of 
LGBTQ identity in the child welfare domain is not simply a child 
welfare problem. Rather, LGBTQ-based inequality in the child 
welfare system has deeper roots in structural and cultural 
LGBTQ-based inequality in society at large.475 In affording pro-
tection to religiously motivated discrimination against LGBTQ 
youth, broad religious exemptions involving LGBTQ child wel-
fare perpetuate and recreate LGBTQ-based inequality both in-
side and outside of the child welfare system.  
Accordingly, LGBTQ-based inequality in the child welfare 
domain should be viewed as pertinent to the fight for LGBTQ 
 
 470. Religiously motivated discrimination in the welfare system contributes 
to the high rates of homelessness and instability among LGBTQ youth. See su-
pra notes 445–69 and accompanying text. 
 471. See supra notes 458–68 and accompanying text. 
 472. See Roberts, Child Welfare and Civil Rights, supra note 46, at 171 (ar-
guing “[c]hild welfare is not usually viewed as a civil rights issue,” but dispari-
ties indicate it should be). 
 473. See id. at 178 (“Both aspects of the child welfare system’s racial dispar-
ity—the State’s intrusion in families and its racial bias—are essential to ex-
plaining its injustice.”). 
 474. Id. at 182. 
 475. Cf. id. at 171 (arguing injustice in the child welfare system is tied to 
broader economic and racial inequalities). Both LGBTQ youth and youth of ra-
cial and ethnic minorities are disproportionately represented in the child wel-
fare system. See supra notes 418, 454, 470–74 and accompanying text. 
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civil rights, including progress toward a fully inclusive LGBTQ 
antidiscrimination regime. Such a regime must not only protect 
LGBTQ adults, and particularly those in same-sex relationships, 
but rather protect all LGBTQ people who are vulnerable to mar-
ginalization within major social institutions, including LGBTQ 
youth in the child welfare system. It is impossible to move in this 
direction, however, when the debate over religious liberty and 
LGBTQ equality centers on same-sex marriage and overlooks 
LGBTQ youth in the child welfare system. 
  CONCLUSION   
The theoretical and historical analysis in this Article has 
demonstrated why it is essential to not neglect the experiences 
of LGBTQ youth in the child welfare system in the debate over 
conflicts between religious liberty and LGBTQ equality. In re-
casting broad religious exemptions involving LGBTQ child wel-
fare through the lens of historical theories of sexual deviance, 
this Article has demonstrated that the push for these exemp-
tions is the latest point on a much longer historical trajectory of 
child welfare interventions that subordinate LGBTQ youth 
based on sexual deviance concepts. Examining these religious 
exemptions through this new theoretical frame helps to excavate 
their full normative and practical consequences both inside and 
outside of the child welfare domain. 
To reiterate, I fully recognize the importance of religious lib-
erty, and acknowledge that balancing religious liberty with 
LGBTQ equality in the child welfare domain requires drawing 
lines that are inherently difficult. The proper balance may ulti-
mately weigh in favor of limited religious exemptions in specific 
contexts. Drawing these lines requires deeper analysis into the 
proper use of taxpayer funds for child welfare services and the 
extent to which child welfare is conceptualized as a public func-
tion for the benefit of the state.476 Although this Article does not 
advocate for drawing lines in a particular way, its analysis illus-
 
 476. Two federal district courts are already addressing this question in pend-
ing litigation involving same-sex couples who were denied foster or adoptive 
services by a taxpayer-funded, faith-based child placing agency. See Dumont v. 
Lyon, 341 F. Supp. 701, 713 (E.D. Mich. 2018) (alleging denial of prospective 
adoption based on same-sex status is a constitutional violation); First Amended 
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Monetary Damages at 3, 
Marouf v. Azar, No. 1:18-cv-378 (D.D.C. Mar. 22, 2018), 2018 WL 4859792 (ar-
guing the use of religious doctrine to deny same-sex couple adoptions and fos-
tering “impermissibly discriminates against same-sex couples”). 
  
2420 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:2343 
 
trates the importance of not losing sight of the historical and in-
stitutional context in which these lines will be drawn when de-
ciding whether and how to accommodate religion in situations 
involving LGBTQ child welfare. 
Douglas NeJaime and Reva Siegel’s proposed theory of rec-
ognizing third party harm in religious accommodation is one pos-
sible approach to recognize the harms that broad religious ex-
emptions impose on LGBTQ youth in the child welfare system 
while also recognizing religious liberty.477 NeJaime and Siegel’s 
proposal emphasizes the need for law and doctrine to consider 
the material and dignitary harms that religious exemptions in-
flict on third parties when deciding whether and how to accom-
modate religious objections.478 Specifically, NeJaime and Siegel 
argue that religious accommodations should be structured in 
ways that both ensure that individuals are not denied access to 
goods and services (material harms), as well as protect them 
from stigmatizing encounters (dignitary harms).479 When this 
structuring is not feasible, they contend that third party harm 
may be a justification to deny religious accommodation.480 
Applying NeJaime and Siegel’s proposal to the LGBTQ child 
welfare context would demand that law and doctrine take into 
account the material and dignitary harms that broad religious 
exemptions impose on LGBTQ youth in the child welfare system. 
Structuring religious accommodations would require that the 
state ensure that LGBTQ youth have access to supportive living 
environments in the child welfare system, and protect them from 
stigmatizing encounters that are rooted in religiously motivated 
discrimination against their sexual orientations and gender 
identities. If it is not feasible for states to do so when accommo-
dating religion, then the harms that broad religious exemptions 
impose on LGBTQ youth in the child welfare domain would jus-
tify denying religious accommodation in this specific institu-
tional context. 
There are other important insights that NeJaime and 
Siegel’s proposal has for the LGBTQ child welfare context. Plu-
ralism is the underlying value that animates NeJaime and 
 
 477. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 478. See NeJaime & Siegel, Conscience Wars in Transnational Perspective, 
supra note 49, at 218 (arguing for “a genuinely pluralist . . . regime” in order to 
protect “citizens from material and dignitary harms”). 
 479. See NeJaime & Siegel, Religious Accommodation, supra note 49, at 11. 
 480. See NeJaime & Siegel, Conscience Wars in Transnational Perspective, 
supra note 49, at 218. 
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Siegel’s proposed theory of third-party harm.481 They argue that 
only when religious accommodations are structured in ways that 
mediate third party harms can those accommodations genuinely 
further pluralist ends and protect the different interests of a het-
erogeneous and diverse society.482 In their view, when religious 
accommodation ignores the impact of broad exemptions on third 
parties, those exemptions simply promote the interests of the ob-
jectors and do not promote pluralism.483 They further emphasize 
that religious claimants may frame themselves as a minority, 
but advance claims that are rooted in normative views that have 
long been used by the majority against third parties “whose 
rights the law has only recently and fragilely come to protect.”484  
Drawing on these insights, the sexual deviance frame re-
veals how broad religious exemptions involving LGBTQ child 
welfare are really a vehicle for enduring anxiety about sexual 
deviance and attempts to shape and control the sexual orienta-
tions and gender identities of youth to conform to traditional 
norms of sex, sexuality, and gender. Religious objectors invoke a 
type of agenda rooted in sexual deviance that the law and doc-
trine has renounced when articulated explicitly to sustain crim-
inal sodomy prohibitions or same-sex marriage restrictions.485 In 
the LGBTQ child welfare context, however, proponents of broad 
religious exemptions invoke religious liberty arguments in ways 
that undermine protections for LGBTQ youth and allow out-
moded sexual deviance concepts to thrive in hidden and less ob-
vious ways. NeJaime and Siegel’s analysis tells us that this re-
sult not only harms a highly vulnerable segment of the LGBTQ 
population, but also threatens pluralism itself in a diverse soci-
ety.486  
Regardless of how these lines are ultimately drawn, this Ar-
ticle has shown that religious exemptions involving LGBTQ 
child welfare intervene against the backdrop of a public welfare 
system that is already fraught with LGBTQ-based inequalities 
and that commonly fails LGBTQ youth in need of help from the 
 
 481. See NeJaime & Siegel, Religious Accommodation, supra note 49, at 9. 
 482. See NeJaime & Siegel, Conscience Wars in Transnational Perspective, 
supra note 49, at 218 (“[C]onscience exemptions of a genuinely pluralist kind 
endeavor to mediate the impact of accommodation on third parties, providing 
for the welfare of normatively heterogeneous citizenry.”). 
 483. See NeJaime & Siegel, Religious Accommodation, supra note 49, at 9. 
 484. Id. 
 485. See, e.g., supra notes 212–17 and accompanying text. 
 486. Cf. NeJaime & Siegel, Religious Accommodation, supra note 49, at 9 
(“[A]ccomodating religion can also entrench inequality between groups.”). 
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state. Considering how broad religious exemptions involving 
LGBTQ child welfare may exacerbate problems for this already 
vulnerable segment of the LGBTQ population is essential in 
evaluating whether these exemptions resolve conflicts between 
religious liberty and LGBTQ equality in a fair and balanced way. 
 
